måndag 24 maj 2010

FT om det svenska skolsystemet


"Finland, which does not have free schools, boasts excellent results thanks to the high quality of its teachers, who provide support to pupils falling behind. But experts there worry that the system is not flexible enough to allow the brightest to perform to the best of their ability. In Asia, governments fear that in spite of good scores, pupils are spoon-fed and lack intellectual independence.

In England’s case, the motivation is a malaise common in many other western countries. A stubborn core of children leaves school with few or no qualifications, and problems with literacy and numeracy that provoke constant complaints from employers.
/.../
although Swedish free schools achieve on average better results than state-run rivals, problems remain. Asked how one runs an excellent school system, Per Thullberg, head of the Swedish government’s agency for education, says bluntly: 'We can’t give the world good examples.'

His scepticism is supported by recent results. Since free schools were set up, pupil performance across the Swedish system has declined in comparison with international peers.

Jan-Eric Gustafsson of Gothenburg university adds that, since the 1990s, there has also been a 'steep decline' in attainment compared with previous generations of Swedes. In addition, according to Mr Thullberg, free schools do no better than others in academic tests, after allowing for the fact that families choosing them tend to be more highly educated.

Even Bertil Ostberg, schools minister in the ruling centre-right coalition and a pioneer of free schools, is sceptical. He says that in the 1990s, reformers hoped that through 'competition over quality, all schools should become better'. He concludes: 'I wouldn’t say that this has failed but maybe some expectations were too high that this would change the system as a whole.' /.../

Mikael Lindahl, an economist at Stockholm University, says the free market model has not fully worked because it has been difficult to implement an essential element of competition – closing unwanted schools.

According to Samuel Huhta, the state-run school he heads in a suburb of Stockholm has capacity for 600 pupils and used to have that number on its rolls. However, because of competition from local free schools, now 'we’ve got about half of that'. Three years ago, he says, the city council earmarked 10 out of 140 schools, including his own, for closure because of falling pupil numbers. However, parental pressure and media opposition ensured that none were shut.

Mr Gove acknowledges Sweden’s difficulties in closing schools. His solution is to make it easier for parents to take over old ones.

Critics are unimpressed. John Dunford, of the Association of School and College Leaders, warns that the 'very mixed' evidence from Sweden on whether free schools boost standards makes it 'like an act of faith by the government to introduce them here'.

In Sweden advocates of free schools, such as Mats Pertoft, Green party education spokesman, acknowledge that that they have not markedly improved results. But, for him, this was never the point – choice was."
David Turner, "The Swedish module", Financial Times 23 maj

"The Swedish schools model championed by the Conservatives may not be cost-effective if imported to England, according to a paper from the London School of Economics.

Michael Gove, shadow schools secretary, has proposed increasing parental choice over the type of school that their child attends, by allowing parents’ groups, charities, trusts and voluntary organisations to set up schools. They would be taxpayer-funded, not-for-profit and free, but independent from state control. This pluralistic system has much in common with the Swedish regime, which the Conservatives have praised. The Tories have argued that greater choice would improve the quality of education – partly through the free-market virtue of boosting competition.

However, the LSE note says: 'Importing the Swedish model may not make very much difference to the UK’s educational status quo.' It explains: 'In the early 1990s, Sweden started from a position of no school choice: all pupils had to attend the state school in their neighbourhood. In the UK, however, there is already much school choice and a diversity of provision.'

It also finds flaws in attempting 'the application of market economics to the public sector'. The essay explains: 'There is no natural mechanism for closing down poor schools (they do not literally go bust). Closing down schools can be slow, political and unpopular.' In reality, 'governments will have to support simultaneously the new schools and the older ‘‘bad’’ ones ... The latter will not exit at an efficient rate'. The authors say this would reduce the 'cost-effectiveness' of 'school creation'. "
David Turner, "Warning over Tory schools proposals", FT 23 maj

söndag 16 maj 2010

Lindgren och Linder om löneandelen

"Årets avtalsrörelse präglas av ordet ansvar. Svenskt Näringsliv har gått i spetsen och trummat ut sina krav på att löntagarna helst inte skulle ha fått något alls.

Men också fackföreningsrörelsen har pratat mycket om ansvar.

Innan LO-förbunden fastställde sina avtalskrav analyserade LO uppgifter från mängder av ekonomer med uppgift att värdera vilka löneökningar den svenska ekonomin tål. Man ville agera ansvarsfullt och LO-kraven låg exempelvis inom ramen för vad Konjunkturinstitutet beskrev som lämpligt.

Ändå blev de verkliga utfallet från de hittills tecknade avtalen betydligt lägre än samordningskraven. Avtalen ger mindre än 70 procent av de ursprungliga kraven.

Vi ifrågasätter om det är ansvarsfullt.

I själva verket tenderar begreppet ”ansvar” att förvandlas till ett ideologiskt slagträ, som snarare legitimerar kapitalägarnas rofferi, än beskriver det faktum att nationen Sverige mår bättre av en jämnare fördelning av rikedomarna.
/.../
ETUI – European Trade Union Institute – har undersökt hur ersättningen till lönearbete förhåller sig till ersättningen till kapital. Ur ett löntagarperspektiv är resultatet nedslående; lönearbetets andel av BNP har sjunkit konstant i hela EU medan kapitalandelen har ökat.

Från 1985 till 2008 sjönk andelen från 59 till 57 procent för hela EU och ännu mer för de västliga EU-länderna; från 59 till 56. Mellan åren 2003–2006 sjönk löneandelen i 20 av EU 27 medlemsländer.

För Sveriges del var löneandelen av BNP som högst 1977, med dryga 69 procent, och har till 2008 sjunkit till 58. Sett över hela perioden 1995–2008 har visserligen löneandelen i Sverige ökat något. Under denna period nådde den sin topp år 2001 med 66 procent men sjönk sedan till 58. Vad betyder då denna minskning för välfärdens finansiering?

Svaret är enkelt – mindre pengar till välfärd. Om löneandelen av BNP i Sverige hade varit den samma som 2001 skulle det finnas drygt 84 miljarder mer i statskassan och om löneandelen befunnit sig på 1977 års nivå hade tillgångarna ökat med drygt 320 miljarder."
Lars Lindgren & Clas Linder, "En ökad löneandel räddar välfärden", LO-Tidningen 29 april

--
jfr 19 jan 09 "Projekt: distributionsteori (politisk ekonomi)"

UPPDATERING
Nya artiklar om den funktionella inkomstfördelningen i Unionens medlemstidning Kollega och i LO-Tidningen:

Kollega, nr 8 2010 (december):
http://www.e-magin.se/v5/viewer/files/viewer_s.aspx?gIssue=8&gTitle=&gYear=2010&gKey=2f5jbp05&gAvailWidth=1014&gAvailHeight=733&gInitPage=1&gHotspot=0

LO-tidningen, 10 december 2010:
http://lotidningen.se/2010/12/10/vinsterna-okar-%E2%80%93-men-inte-lonerna/
http://lotidningen.se/2010/12/10/facket-far-problem-om-inte-lontagarnas-andel-vaxer/
http://lotidningen.se/2010/12/10/%E2%80%9Ddet-har-ar-en-global-forandring%E2%80%9D/

Makten i världsekonomin - var finns den?

Vem bestämmer i världsekonomin? Ofta framställs världsekonomin som en naturkraft bortom mänsklig kontroll - om det, se Dino Viscovis fina avhandling Marknaden som mönster och monster (2006). En "bieffekt" av det är förstås att alla distributiva outcomes blir "naturliga" och "opåverkbara". "Den osynliga och blodiga handen" regerar då.

Men jag tycker inte att det funkar.
Marknaderna är koncentrerade; vissa firmor är antagligen prissättare och inte bara pristagare.
Världsekonomin är ständigt i ojämn utveckling.
Jag tror att man kan "av-mystifiera" världsekonomin utifrån detta.
Och att den populära "globaliseringslitteraturen" - Klein, Martin & Schumann osv - gjorde det jävligt dåligt.
Jag tror att det behövs mer empiri.

Harvard-företagsekonomen Rawi Abdelal har skrivit en väldigt föredömlig bok där, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance (2007). Han har gjort en studie av hur internationell finans har reglerats under 1900-talet och kollar på staters (representanters) agerande i olika internationella strukturer. Arkivstudier och intervjuer. Inga konstigheter, väldigt empiriskt. Och av-mystifierande, tror jag. En "marknad" blir inte bara till ex nihilo utan personer som agerar och fastslår reglerna (institutionerna) för den.

På så sätt kan man också historisera marknaderna.

Louis W Pauly (1997) Who elected the bankers? Surveillance and control in the world economy. Cornell UP
Layna Mosley (2003) Global capital and national governments. Cambridge UP
James Vreeland (2002) The IMF and economic development. Cambridge UP
Ethan Kapstein (1994) Governing the global economy: International Finance and the State. Harvard UP
Rawi F Abdelal (2007) Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance. Harvard UP
Leonard Seabrooke (2006) The social sources of financial power. Cornell UP
Jeffry M Chwieroth (2010) Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization. Princeton UP
Timothy J Sinclair (2005) The new masters of capital: American bond rating agencies and the politics of credit worthiness. Cornell UP
Claire A Cutler (2003) Private power and global authority: Transnational merchant law in the global political economy. Cambridge UP
Jennifer Clapp (2001) Toxic exports: The transfer of hazardous wastes from rich to poor countries. Cornell UP
Linda Weiss (ed) (2003) States in the Global Economy. Cambridge UP

---
"In keeping with its practice when rating bonds as junk, S&P gave an estimate of the likely 'recovery rate' should the worst happen. It said bondholders were likely to get back only 30-50% of their principal were Greece to restructure its debt or to default. That prompted panic in bond markets. The yield on Greece’s ten-year bonds leapt above 11% and that on two-year bonds to almost 19% at one point on April 28th. Portugal’s borrowing rates jumped, too."
Economist, "Briefing: The euro zone's debt crisis", 1 maj


----

"Hedge funds would seem to be a business in which location doesn’t matter. Buy and sell orders can be executed from a beachfront villa in Costa Rica just as fast as from a cube farm in midtown, and the laws of economics dictate that businesses seek out the lowest-cost destinations. Yet the hedge-fund industry exhibits one of the most vivid examples of concentration in today’s economy—and it does so in two of the world’s most expensive places. Lower Hedgistan is an L-shaped wedge encompassing the Upper East Side (from Park Avenue to the park) and the so-called Plaza district of trophy midtown office buildings. Upper Hedgistan is Greenwich, Connecticut. Separated by 30 miles, these two islands of prosperity form a closed circuit via the Hutchinson River Parkway and I-95, and function as a single, insanely profitable ecosystem. Of the world’s 351 funds with more than $1 billion in assets, 143—or 40 percent—are based in Greater Hedgistan."
Daniel Gross, "The Kingdom of Hedgistan", New York Magazine 9 april 2007

"If the hedge-fund boom has a capital, it is Greenwich, a ritzy suburb of mansions and gated estates about 30 miles from Manhattan. More than 100 hedge funds -- private investment pools that cater to wealthy investors and institutions -- have set up shop here in the past few years, a sign of the industry's explosive growth. Greenwich-based hedge funds collectively manage more than $100 billion, about a tenth of the total invested in hedge funds world-wide.

The invasion reflects an escalating race for status and convenience among managers of hedge funds. Greenwich, a town of 62,000 located on the shores of Long Island Sound, is still mainly a residential community, with limited office space. Yet because many of the richest fund managers want to live in Greenwich -- and work close to home -- they're quickly turning the town into hedge-fund row."
Ianthe Jeanne Dugan & Robert Frank, "Hedge funds at home in Greenwich, Conn.", Wall Street Journal 4 augusti 2005

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Uppdatering 7 november 2011
"Most economists today don’t ask who rules the global economy, visualizing it as a decentralized competitive market that cannot be ruled. Yet new evidence suggests that global economic clout is highly concentrated among large interlocking transnational companies.

Three Swiss experts on complex network analysis have recently examined the architecture of international ownership, analyzing a large database of transnational corporations. They concluded that a large portion of control resides with a relatively small core of financial institutions, with about 147 tightly knit companies controlling about 40 percent of the total wealth in the network.

Their analysis draws heavily on network topology, a methodology that biologists use to good effect. An article in the British magazine New Scientist describes the research as evidence of a global financial oligarchy. /.../"

Nancy Folbre, "Who Rules the World Economy?", NYT Economix 7 november

lördag 15 maj 2010

En liberal om inkomstfördelning, 4

"Jämlikhet låter bra, men ungdomsarbetslöshet, stagnation och begränsade möjligheter för människor att söka sin egen lycka är ett för högt pris att betala för den."
Maria Eriksson, "Vad kostar jämlikheten?", SvD ledare 8 mars 2010

kausalitet 1: jämlikhet --> högre ungdomsarbetslöshet
kausalitet 2: jämlikhet --> stagnation
kausalitet 3: jämlikhet --> "begränsade möjligheter för människor att söka sin egen lycka"

1. om ungdomsarbetslöshet.

- nästa figur med ration ungdomsarbetslöshet - arbetslöshet överlag istället, för att fånga de effekter som inkomstfördelning eventuellt har på distributionen av arbetslösheten mellan grupper:


Källa ungdomsarbetslöshet: Eurostat, Europe in Figures: Eurostat Yearbook 2009, tabell 7.7, s 283; ration beräknad helt enkelt som ungdomsarbetslöshetsgraden/totala arbetslöshetsgraden
Källa gini: OECD Growing unequal

Men vad med de ungdomar som står utanför helt, som varken arbetar eller studerar?

Källa: gini från SWIID (Growing unequal som jag använde ovan har bara en årpunkt)
Källa: inaktivitet - detta är för unga kvinnor, konstigt nog anger excel-arket bara för könen separat, men mönstret är rätt likt mellan kvinnor och män - från OECD Society at a Glance 2008.

Egentligen kanske man borde använda brutto-gini om det finns. Och det finns också invändningar mot SWIID.

2. om tillväxten, se "En liberal om inkomstfördelning, 3"


3. om "begränsade möjligheter för människor att söka sin egen lycka", se:
Jfr, 1:
"This paper breaks new ground by providing comparable estimates of intergenerational wage and education persistence across 14 European OECD countries based on a new micro data from Eurostat. A further novelty is that it examines the potential role of public policies and labour and product market institutions in explaining observed differences in intergenerational wage mobility across countries. The empirical estimates show that intergenerational wage persistence is relatively high in southern European countries, as well as in the United Kingdom. Likewise, intergenerational persistence in education is relatively high both in southern European countries and in Luxembourg and Ireland. By contrast, both persistence in wages and education tends to be lower in Nordic countries. In addition, empirical results show that education is one important driver of intergenerational wage persistence across European countries. There is a positive crosscountry correlation between intergenerational wage mobility and redistributive policies, as well as a positive correlation between wage-setting institutions that compress the wage distribution and mobility."
Orsetta Causa, Sophie Dantan & Åsa Johansson, "Intergenerational social mobility in European OECD countries", (pdf) OECD Economics Department Working Paper no 709, 2009

Jfr, 2:
"The United States is the most unequal affluent country. It has the highest level of
earnings inequality among employed individuals and the highest level of posttaxposttransfer income inequality among households (Kenworthy 2004, 2008;
Pontusson 2005; Brandolini and Smeeding 2006; Burniaux, Padrini, and Brandt
2006). But these conclusions are based on single-year snapshots of the population.
Many believe that the United States also has more mobility of earnings and income than other countries - that is, individuals move up and down in the distribution with greater frequency and to a greater extent. If this is true, inequality of long-run ("permanent") earnings and income in the United States may be comparable to or perhaps even less than in other countries. A number of researchers have examined the degree to which multiple-year inequality differs from single-year inequality (Burkhauser and Poupore 1997; Jarvis and Jenkins 1998; Buchinsky and Hunt 1999; Gittleman and Joyce 1999; Goodin et al. 1999; Cantó 2000; Aaberge et al. 2002; Gangl 2005). The finding typically has been that inequality measured using average income over a five- or ten-year period is 10% to 30% less than when measured for a single year. But do countries differ in the degree to which mobility over time reduces
inequality? In recent years a handful of studies have examined comparative earnings
and/or income inequality over multi-year periods. An OECD (1996) study
compared earnings inequality in the United States and seven European countries
during a five-year period from 1986 to 1991. Burkhauser and Poupore (1997)
compared income inequality in the United States and Germany during the 1980s.
Aaberge et al. (2002) examined earnings and income inequality in the United
States, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden over a ten-year period from 1980 to 1990.
Schluter (1998) examined income inequality in the United States, Germany, and
the United Kingdom during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Goodin et al. (1999)
compared income inequality in the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands
during a ten-year period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Gangl (2005) examined income inequality in the United States and eleven European countries
over a six-year period in the mid-to-late 1990s. Each of these studies found little
or no alteration of the country rank-ordering when switching from a single-year
measure of inequality to a multi-year measure. And all found that, as when
measured in single years, inequality measured over multiple years tends to be
comparatively high in the United States.
/.../
As we suggested earlier, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that there is greater
relative intragenerational mobility of earnings and income in the United States
than in Germany or Sweden. If the hypothesis was correct, the degree of inequality
in the United States would not be so high relative to the other two countries
when we shift from a measure of inequality based on earnings or incomes aggregated
over a single year to a measure aggregated over many years. However, our
data suggest that this is not the case — or at least that it was not the case in the
1980s and 1990s. High U.S. inequality was not offset by greater mobility."
Markus Gangl, Joakim Palme, and Lane Kenworthy, "Is High Inequality Offset by Mobility?", (pdf) working paper, 2008

Jfr, 3:
"Den här rapporten handlar om social rörlighet. Med detta avses i vilken utsträckning ekonomiska fördelar ärvs mellan generationer. De nordiska länderna är socialt rörligare än andra utvecklade länder. Rörligheten är lägst i USA, men endast något högre i länder som Storbritannien, Italien och Frankrike. Därmed är livschanserna bättre fördelade i Sverige. Vi kan i högre utsträckning än andra frigöra oss från vår historia och bli den vi vill bli. Den amerikanska drömmen är en realitet i de nordiska länderna, men i praktiken en mardröm på andra sidan atlanten.
Orsakerna till den höga (låga) sociala rörligheten i Norden (USA) handlar i grund och botten om samhällets institutionella struktur – om i vilken utsträckning samhället tillåts kompensera för skillnader i uppväxtvillkor och familjeförhållanden, om utbildningssystemets struktur, om avkastningen på utbildning, om lönespridningen, om inkomstskillnaderna, om förekomsten av arbeten med låga löner, om graden av omfördelning."
Daniel Lind, "Hur långt från trädet faller äpplet?", Arbetarrörelsens ekonomiska råd, Låginkomstutredningen rapport 3, år 2009

Jfr, 4:
"Social rörlighet är i allmänhet större i länder med lägre ojämlikhet i fråga om inkomster och vice versa . Detta innebär i praktiken att om man åstadkommer större jämlikhet i fråga om chanser, uppnås samtidigt socialt rättvisare resultat."
OECD, "Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries", (svensk sammanfattning, pdf), 2009

Jfr, 5: Economist om inkomstfördelning och "möjligheter för människor att söka sin egen lycka" i USA, 17 april:
"The most highly skilled, meanwhile, have stuffed their pockets happily. Between 1970 and 2008 the Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, grew from 0.39 to 0.47. In mid-2008 the typical family’s income was lower than it had been in 2000. The richest 10% earned nearly half of all income, surpassing even their share in 1928, the year before the Great Crash.

Compared with people in other rich countries, Americans tend to accept relatively high levels of income inequality because they believe they may move up over time. The evidence is that America does offer opportunity; but not nearly as much as its citizens believe.

Parental income is a better predictor of a child’s future in America than in much of Europe, implying that social mobility is less powerful. Different groups of Americans have different levels of opportunity. Those born to the middle class have about an equal chance of moving up or down the income ladder, according to the Economic Mobility Project. But those born to black middle-class families are much more likely than their white counterparts to fall in rank. The children of the rich and poor, meanwhile, are less mobile than the middle class’s. More than 40% of those Americans born in the bottom quintile remain stuck there as adults. /.../

How rising inequality affects social mobility is still unclear. Those born since inequality started to rise sharply are only just now becoming adults. However there are some troubling signs according to two papers to be presented at the Tobin Project, an alliance of scholars, this month. Christopher Jencks of Harvard University finds that income inequality has been accompanied by a widening gap in college attendance. Ms Sawhill argues that a rising correlation between income levels, likelihood of marriage and level of education will make society more stagnant. "
Economist, "Upper bound", 17 april 2010 (min fetning)

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del 1: Gert Gelotte/GP
del 2: DN:s ledarsida
del 3: Magnus Andersson/CUF

Bloggserien kanske började 17 feb med ett inlägg om "Lägre skatt på jobb = mer sysselsättning?", utifrån ännu en usel liberal ledarartikel (på GP).

---
EDIT
Karin Nilsson, "Ungdomars utanförskap - allas och ingens ansvar", Arbetsmarknaden 3 september 2010

tisdag 11 maj 2010

En liberal om inkomstfördelning, 3

- Del 3 i en serie om hur liberaler ser på inkomstfördelning; del 1 handlade om Gert Gelotte på GP:s ledarsida (och relationen fördelning-tillväxt), kommande del 2 kommer att handla om DN:s ledarsida (och "höga trösklar för att komma in på arbetsmarknaden", och "för svaga drivkrafter till utbildning"). Denna del utgår från ett parti som inte har alla öl i backen, inte alla böcker i hyllan, inte alla hästar i stallet, inte alla chips i skålen - centerpartiet.
"För mig som liberal är det fattigdom, inte rikedom, som är problemet. Politiker borde fundera mer över hur vi ska kunna hjälpa och lyfta de som är fattiga; och mindre över hur vi ska hålla tillbaka de som lyckats lyfta sig ur fattigdomen. Jag befinner mig hellre i ett ekonomiskt ojämlikt samhälle som är dynamiskt – där en persons lycka inte förutsätter någon annans olycka, och där man därför tillåts och uppmuntras att skapa sig ett bättre liv – än i ett jämlikt men statiskt samhälle – där vi alla har det lika dåligt och där en persons framgång ogillas av alla andra, eftersom de inser att om pajen inte växer så innebär det att om någon får en större bit så blir det mindre över till oss andra."
Magnus Andersson, CUF, i P1:s program OBS på temat jämlikhet

- A framställer det som att det råder en valsituation mellan "ett ekonomiskt ojämlikt samhälle som är dynamiskt" och "ett jämlikt men statiskt samhälle".

Vad är då "dynamiskt"? Man kan tänka sig några olika definitioner. A förespråkar ett samhälle "där man tillåts och uppmuntras att skapa sig ett bättre liv". Jag kan väl tänka mig i alla fall 2 olika ekonomiska tolkningar av det
1) ett rikare land/ett land med högre tillväxt: om landet i allmänhet är rikt och/eller blir rikare, är det större sannolikhet att den enskilde också blir rikare. ("lifting all boats")
2) ett land med större social rörlighet. Sambandet mellan inkomstojämlikhet och social rörlighet har jag citerat om här och här.

Då återstår förhållandet mellan ekonomisk ojämlikhet och tillväxt/rikedom. Förhållandet ojämlikhet-tillväxt skrev jag om i del 1, utifrån Gelotte. Men det finns mer att citera där

DEN VÄLDIGT LÅNGA SIKTEN/UTVECKLINGSEKONOMI
1
"Whereas traditional explanations of differences in long-run paths of development across the Americas generally point to the significance of differences in national heritage or religion, we highlight the relevance of stark contrasts in the degree of inequality in wealth, human capital, and political power in accounting for how fundamental economic institutions evolved over time. We argue, moreover, that the roots of these disparities in the extent of inequality lay in differences in the initial factor endowments (dating back to the era of European colonization). We document -- through comparative studies of suffrage, public land, and schooling policies -- systematic patterns by which societies in the Americas that began with more extreme inequality or heterogeneity in the population were more likely to develop institutional structures that greatly advantaged members of elite classes (and disadvantaging the bulk of the population) by providing them with more political influence and access to economic opportunities. The clear implication is that institutions should not be presumed to be exogenous; economists need to learn more about where they come from to understand their relation to economic development. Our findings not only contribute to our knowledge of why extreme differences in the extent of inequality across New World economies have persisted for centuries, but also to the study of processes of long-run economic growth past and present."

Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies", NBER Working Paper No. 9259, oktober 2002

2
"We argue that social polarization reduces the security of property and contract rights and, through this channel, reduces growth. The first hypothesis is supported by crosscountry evidence indicating that polarization in the form of income inequality, land inequality, and ethnic tensions is inversely related to a commonly-used index of the security of contractual and property rights. When the security of property rights is controlled for in cross-country growth regressions, the relationship between inequality and growth diminishes considerably. This and other evidence provides support for our second hypothesis, that inequality reduces
growth in part through its effect on the security of property rights."

Philip Keefer & Stephen Knack, "Polarization, politics and property rights: Links between inequality and growth", Public Choice, 2002

3
"on the effect of inequality on growth in market economies: the conventional textbook approach is that inequality is good for incentives and therefore good for growth, even though incentive and growth considerations might (sometimes) be traded off against equity or insurance goals. On the other hand, development economists have long expressed counterarguments, although not in a formalized way. For example, Michael Todaro's book Economic Development provides four general arguments why 'greater equality in developing countries may in fact be a condition for self-sustaining economic growth,' namely: (a) disaving and/or unproductive investment by the rich; (b) lower levels of human capital held by the poor; (c)demand pattern of the poor being more biased toward local goods; and (d) political rejection by the masses. Recently, the view that inequality is growth-enhancing has been further challenged by a number of empirical studies, often based on cross-country regressions of GDP growth on income inequality. They all find a negative correlation between the average rate of growth and a number of measures of inequality."
Philippe Aghion, Eve Caroli & Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa, "Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories", Journal of Economic Literature december 1999

4
"[teoriöversikt] At the risk of some oversimplification, the recent literature on income distribution and growth can be divided into three main approaches: the 'fiscal policy', 'socio-political instability', and 'imperfect capital market' approaches. A fourth approach, which deals with the relationship between income distribution on one side and human capital investment and fertility decisions on the other, has not been fully formalized, to the best of my knowledge. /.../
[findings] More equal societies have lower fertility rates and higher rates of investment in education. Both are reflected in higher rates of growth. Also, very unequal societies tend to be politically and socially unstable, which is reflected in lower rates of investment and therefore growth. Finally, the data do not support the idea that more equal societies, particularly those with democratic institutions, grow faster because they generate less demands for redistribution and therefore less distortions."

Roberto Perotti, "Growth, Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say",
Columbia University 1994-95 Discussion Paper Series No. 757

5
"Poverty matters to positive economics because it transforms the way the entire economy works. Arguments for this proposition abound in the development literature. The simplest and most influential is based on the premise that the poor have some behavioral trait that makes them stay poor: poverty is a 'trap.' The fraction of nonpoor in the population then determines the potential for wealth accumulation of the economy; countries with fewer poor will grow faster.
This argument is somewhat unsatisfying because it is not clear that the evident behavioral differences between the poor and everyone else-the poor save less and are
less likely to become entrepreneurs, for example- arise from differences in preferences and abilities or instead from differences in the economic environment.
An insight from the recent literature on incentives is that a similar case can be made without reference to any distinctive behavioral traits of the poor; it relies simply on the fact that the poor are closer to the lower bound on their utility than the rest of the population. Consequently, threats of punishment work less well against the poor than against others: the poor behave as if they have nothing to lose. The poor then find it harder than everyone else to borrow and insure, and that in turn makes them behave differently."

Abhijit V. Banerjee and Andrew F. Newman, "Poverty, Incentives, and Development",
The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 2, maj 1994

6
"Is inequality harmful for growth? We suggest that it is."

Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?", American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, juni 1994

- papers som dock hävdar att ojämlikhet är bra för tillväxten: Kristin J Forbes, "A Reassessment of the Relationship Between Inequality and Growth", American Economic Review september 2001; Walter Block, "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth", 2001

OECD-LÄNDER IDAG

Jonas Pontusson, "Den nordiska modellen och det sociala Europa", Arbetsmarknad & Arbetsliv nr 4 2006

data på gini från LIS
data på BNP från OECD
(punkten med högst gini och lägst tillväxt i diagrammet: USA:s 00-tal)

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Uppdatering 20 juli 2011
Mer om inkomstfördelning och ekonomisk utveckling i förindustriella samhällen: Peter Lindert (UC Davis) och Jeffrey Williamson (Harvard) hävdar med nya data att en relativt jämlik inkomstfördelning i USA under den revolutionära perioden ledde till högre tillväxt.
Lindert och Williamson, "America's Revolution: Economic Disaster, Development, and Equality", voxeu 15 juli

torsdag 6 maj 2010

Liedman om den röda tråden "68"-->"82", 1982

"Om vi vill förenkla, så kan vi säga att såväl kritiken från vänster som den från höger riktas emot idén om den välsignelsebringande samhällsingenjören. Men samhällsingenjören - ekonomen, sociologen, psykologen - var och är inte en isolerad individ. Han ingår i, är knuten till en anonym maktstruktur - statlig, kommunal, privat, eller facklig. Och här har vi en av de viktigaste förbindelselänkarna mellan '68' och '82': misstron mot dessa ansiktslösa maktstrukturer, kort sagt mot den anonyma makten ovanför 'vanliga människors' huvuden. Identifikationen och namngivningen har skiftat. Många som den gången helst talade om kapitalismen, om det militär-industriella komplexet, om staten som kapitalets förlängda arm, tar nu snarare utgångspunkten för sin kritik i själva staten, i byråkratin, i facket, och kommer först omsider, om någonsin, fram till en kritik av det kapitalistiska systemet."
"68" och "82" är två sidor av samma mynt; "barn av samma upplösning av den tidigare efterkrigstidens växande-kaka-optimism"
Sven-Eric Liedman, Frihetens herrar, frihetens knektar (Arbetarkultur, 1982), s 20

- jfr 25 februari 09, "Dialektik vs postmodernism/nyliberalism", 20 juli 09 "ur Frenander 1998", 16 september 09, "Hay om pomo och politik", 19 dec 08 "Reaktionär intellektuell kritik av socialdemokratin".

tisdag 4 maj 2010

Larsson vs Olofsson om gymnasieskolan

Jonas Olofsson, Krisen i skolan (Boréa, 2010)

Petter Larsson, "Farlig skolväg", Aftonbladet kultur 24 mars 2010 - recension av Olofssons bok

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Om förlängningen av yrkesprogrammens betydelse:
"I reformen av gymnasieskolan 1991 förlängdes de tidigare 2-åriga yrkeslinjerna
till 3-åriga program med fler allmänna teoretiska ämnen. Detta medförde att även
elever från yrkesinriktade utbildningar fick allmän behörighet till högskolan.
Artikeln undersöker vilka effekter förlängningen av yrkesutbildningarna hade
på elevernas senare utbildnings- och arbetsmarknadsutfall genom att utvärdera
en omfattande försöksverksamhet med 3-åriga yrkeslinjer som föregick reformen.
Resultaten visar att förlängningen medförde en ökad sannolikhet att hoppa av
gymnasiet för elever med låga grundskolebetyg och från icke-akademiska hem.
Resultaten visar inga tecken på att det extra gymnasieåret skulle ha medfört en
ökad övergång till högskolestudier. Det finns dock vissa tecken på att förlängningen
av yrkesutbildningarna i försöket kan ha lett till högre inkomster på längre sikt."
Caroline Hall, "Förlängningen av yrkeslinjerna på gymnasiet: effekter på avhopp,
utbildningsnivå och inkomster
" (pdf), Ekonomisk Debatt nr 8 2009
(se också intervju med Caroline Hall på skolporten.com här. Uppsala universitets pressmeddelande om Halls doktorsavhandling, 22 februari 2010, här.)

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Om nedskärningarnas betydelse:
"Mellan läsåren 1990/91 och 2002/03 minskade antalet lärare per hundra grund-skoleelever från 9,1 till 7,7 Omfattningen av resursneddragningarna varierade dock mellan kommuner. I genomsnitt medförde den minskade lärartätheten att eleverna försämrade sin position i betygsfördelningen med 1,2 procentenheter jämfört med tidigare. Om man istället mäter studieprestationer med resultat på mönstringsprovet, verkar effekten av resursneddragningarna vara ungefär dubbelt så stor."
Peter Fredriksson & Björn Öckert, "Hur mycket påverkas studieresultat av resurser?", IFAU rapport 2007:24 (pdf)

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Leder förlängningen av yrkesprogrammen till att fler av eleverna där går till högskolan?
”I sin doktorsavhandling jämför Ekström (2003) personer som gick in i yrkesutbildning av olika längd under övergångsperioden. Denna jämförelse var möjlig att göra eftersom utbildningarna fasades in med skilda hastigheter i olika kommuner. Resultaten visar att förlängningen hade positiva men endast små effekter på övergångarna till högre utbildning. Detta mönster verkar inte heller ha förändrats över tiden. Enligt SCB:s senaste statistik över övergångar från olika gymnasielinjer till högre utbildning (SCB, 2006) går några enstaka procent över från de olika yrkesutbildningarna till högre utbildning. Undantagen utgörs av det estetiska programmet, omvårdnadsprogrammet och medieprogrammet, där övergångsandelarna är mellan 10–30 procent.
Ekström visar även att förlängningen av yrkesutbildningen ledde till en lägre sannolikhet för sysselsättning under de efterföljande åren, en effekt som väl stämmer överens med resultaten ovan. Vissa yrkesprogram har idag också en så svag yrkesprofil att det är tveksamt att ens kalla dem yrkesförberedande. Speciellt gäller detta medieprogrammet och det estetiska programmet. Mindre än 3 procent av dem som avslutat medieprogrammet och därefter fått ett arbete arbetar inom ett journalistyrke, medan det är 5 gånger vanligare att arbeta som maskinoperatör efter fullföljt medieprogram.
Om man summerar vad vi vet om de ekonomiska effekterna av förlängningen av de praktiska utbildningarna är det tydligt att mycket litet tyder på att reformen hade positiva effekter på ungdomars arbetsmarknadssituation. Det har inte gjort att nämnvärt fler går vidare till högre utbildning och reformen verkar snarast ha haft en negativ inverkan på flödet från gymnasium till arbete.” (s 45)
Robert Erikson, Oskar Nordström Skans, Anna Sjögren & Olof Åslund, “Ungdomar och invandrades inträde på arbetsmarknaden 1985-2003”, IFAU Rapport 2007:18 (pdf)
- ref till Erika Ekström, Essays on inequality and education (diss., Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet, 2003) (pdf)

Economist om Tysklands utbildningssystem

"Germany invented the modern university but long ago lost its leading position to other countries, especially America. These days the land of poets and thinkers is prouder of its 'dual system' for training skilled workers such as bakers and electricians. Teenagers not bound for university apply for places in three-year programmes combining classroom learning with practical experience within companies. The result is superior German quality in haircuts as well as cars. Dual training 'is the reason we’re the world export champion' says Mrs Schavan, the education minister. Azubis (trainees) acquire not just a professional qualification but an identity.

But the dual system is under pressure. The number of places offered by companies has long been falling short of the number of applicants. Almost as many youngsters move into a 'transitional system', a grab-bag of remedial education programmes designed to prepare them for the dual system or another qualification. Often it turns out to be a dead end, especially for male immigrants.

And given that Germany produces far fewer university graduates than many comparable countries, some wonder whether the dual system is producing the right qualifications for the knowledge-based professions of the future. 'The dual system is for 200 years ago,' says Alexander Kritikos of DIW, a research institute in Berlin. 'You have to ask: is it still the right system if we want to be innovative?'

The system is governed by a consortium representing almost everyone who counts: the federal and state governments, the chambers of commerce and the unions. It regulates access to 350 narrowly defined trades. You can train to become a goldsmith, or if you want to manage a McDonald’s you learn Systemgastronomie. Baking bread and pastries are separate disciplines. Schools outside the system may not train Azubis for a reserved trade.

It makes sense to combine theory and practice, says Heike Solga of the Social Science Research Centre in Berlin, but the dual system is rigid and discriminatory. And because the trades are so specialised, getting a job at the end can be hard. In 2005 more than a third of graduates were unemployed a year after completing their course. Ms Solga thinks the number of trades should be greatly reduced, the early stages of training made more general to make switching easier, and the right to train Azubis opened up to a wider range of schools. 'It should not be about where you learn but what you can do,' she says.

The type of secondary school a German attends, the degree he obtains and the exams he passes classify him for life. The distinctions are made earlier and more rigidly than in other countries. 'Nowhere are credentials as important as in Germany,' says Stefan Hradil, a sociologist at the University of Mainz.

Many children are typecast at age ten, which is when most German states decide which of three kinds of secondary school he or she will attend. Traditionally the Hauptschulen, the lowest tier, were the main suppliers of recruits to the dual training system, but they gradually became dumping grounds for children who could not keep up. Upon leaving (sometimes without passing the final exam), nearly 40% of these students find themselves in the precarious transitional system. The dual system now draws its intake mainly from the middle-grade Realschulen, the traditional training ground for white-collar workers, and even Gymnasien (grammar schools), the main route to university.

The state bureaucracy acknowledges four career paths: the simple, middle, elevated and higher services. Bureaucrats in one category can rarely aspire to careers in a higher one. Teachers in Gymnasien enjoy a higher status than those at other schools. and have their own trade union, the grandly named Philologenverband. A Meisterbrief, the highest vocational credential, is not just a badge of competence but in some trades a keep-off sign to competitors.

Germans are now asking themselves whether this way of doing things is fair, and whether it is working. Although income is distributed relatively equally, opportunity is not. 'Germany is one of the most rigid among the relatively advanced societies,' says Karl Ulrich Mayer, a sociologist at Yale University.
Economist special report om Tyskland, "Much to learn", 11 mars

måndag 3 maj 2010

Glaeser om skillnader USA - Europa

Individual Level Evidence
- Americans believe that the poor are lazy; Europeans believe that the poor are unfortunate.
- At the individual level, these beliefs correlate with voting Democratic or identifying yourself as left wing.
- 88 percent of those who think that the U.S. is spending too much on welfare think that the poor are lazy
- 35 percent of those who think that U.S. is spending too little on welfare think that the poor are lazy
- There is no way to show causality here, but the correlations are strong and provocative.
s 104
/.../
Examples of Indoctrination
- The early attempt to sell America
- 1624 John Smith: if a settler “have nothing but his hands, he may set up this trade; and by industrie quickly grow rich”
- 1732 Georgia is “a land of liberty and plenty where [the poor] immediately find themselves in possession of a competent estate”
- The ideology of republican revolution
-“If citizens don’t find themselves free and happy, the fault will be intirely their own” (Washington)
s 111
American Exceptionalism
- Political institutions seem to matter– particularly proportional representation.
- We interpret this as a proxy for a broad range of U.S. institutions that block transfers to the poor.
- This shouldn’t surprise us– the founders of the U.S. intended these institutions to do exactly
what they are doing.
- But Europe once had even more right wing institutions than the U.S.
s 119

Edward Glaeser, "Fighting poverty in the U.S. and Europe: a world of difference" (pdf), presentation vid världsbanken år 2004 utifrån denna bok.