- Del 3 i en serie om hur liberaler ser på inkomstfördelning; del 1 handlade om Gert Gelotte på GP:s ledarsida (och relationen fördelning-tillväxt), kommande del 2 kommer att handla om DN:s ledarsida (och "höga trösklar för att komma in på arbetsmarknaden", och "för svaga drivkrafter till utbildning"). Denna del utgår från ett parti som inte har alla öl i backen, inte alla böcker i hyllan, inte alla hästar i stallet, inte alla chips i skålen - centerpartiet.
"För mig som liberal är det fattigdom, inte rikedom, som är problemet. Politiker borde fundera mer över hur vi ska kunna hjälpa och lyfta de som är fattiga; och mindre över hur vi ska hålla tillbaka de som lyckats lyfta sig ur fattigdomen. Jag befinner mig hellre i ett ekonomiskt ojämlikt samhälle som är dynamiskt – där en persons lycka inte förutsätter någon annans olycka, och där man därför tillåts och uppmuntras att skapa sig ett bättre liv – än i ett jämlikt men statiskt samhälle – där vi alla har det lika dåligt och där en persons framgång ogillas av alla andra, eftersom de inser att om pajen inte växer så innebär det att om någon får en större bit så blir det mindre över till oss andra."
Magnus Andersson, CUF, i
P1:s program OBS på temat jämlikhet- A framställer det som att det råder en valsituation mellan "ett ekonomiskt ojämlikt samhälle som är dynamiskt" och "ett jämlikt men statiskt samhälle".
Vad är då "dynamiskt"? Man kan tänka sig några olika definitioner. A förespråkar ett samhälle "där man tillåts och uppmuntras att skapa sig ett bättre liv". Jag kan väl tänka mig i alla fall 2 olika ekonomiska tolkningar av det
1) ett rikare land/ett land med högre tillväxt: om landet i allmänhet är rikt och/eller blir rikare, är det större sannolikhet att den enskilde också blir rikare. ("lifting all boats")
2) ett land med större social rörlighet. Sambandet mellan inkomstojämlikhet och social rörlighet har jag citerat om
här och
här.
Då återstår förhållandet mellan ekonomisk ojämlikhet och tillväxt/rikedom. Förhållandet ojämlikhet-tillväxt skrev jag om i
del 1, utifrån Gelotte. Men det finns mer att citera där
DEN VÄLDIGT LÅNGA SIKTEN/UTVECKLINGSEKONOMI
1
"Whereas traditional explanations of differences in long-run paths of development across the Americas generally point to the significance of differences in national heritage or religion, we highlight the relevance of stark contrasts in the degree of inequality in wealth, human capital, and political power in accounting for how fundamental economic institutions evolved over time. We argue, moreover, that the roots of these disparities in the extent of inequality lay in differences in the initial factor endowments (dating back to the era of European colonization). We document -- through comparative studies of suffrage, public land, and schooling policies -- systematic patterns by which societies in the Americas that began with more extreme inequality or heterogeneity in the population were more likely to develop institutional structures that greatly advantaged members of elite classes (and disadvantaging the bulk of the population) by providing them with more political influence and access to economic opportunities. The clear implication is that institutions should not be presumed to be exogenous; economists need to learn more about where they come from to understand their relation to economic development. Our findings not only contribute to our knowledge of why extreme differences in the extent of inequality across New World economies have persisted for centuries, but also to the study of processes of long-run economic growth past and present."
Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies", NBER Working Paper No. 9259, oktober 2002
2
"We argue that social polarization reduces the security of property and contract rights and, through this channel, reduces growth. The first hypothesis is supported by crosscountry evidence indicating that polarization in the form of income inequality, land inequality, and ethnic tensions is inversely related to a commonly-used index of the security of contractual and property rights. When the security of property rights is controlled for in cross-country growth regressions, the relationship between inequality and growth diminishes considerably. This and other evidence provides support for our second hypothesis, that inequality reduces
growth in part through its effect on the security of property rights."
Philip Keefer & Stephen Knack, "Polarization, politics and property rights: Links between inequality and growth",
Public Choice, 2002
3
"on the effect of inequality on growth in market economies: the conventional textbook approach is that inequality is good for incentives and therefore good for growth, even though incentive and growth considerations might (sometimes) be traded off against equity or insurance goals. On the other hand, development economists have long expressed counterarguments, although not in a formalized way. For example, Michael Todaro's book Economic Development provides four general arguments why 'greater equality in developing countries may in fact be a condition for self-sustaining economic growth,' namely: (a) disaving and/or unproductive investment by the rich; (b) lower levels of human capital held by the poor; (c)demand pattern of the poor being more biased toward local goods; and (d) political rejection by the masses. Recently, the view that inequality is growth-enhancing has been further challenged by a number of empirical studies, often based on cross-country regressions of GDP growth on income inequality. They all find a negative correlation between the average rate of growth and a number of measures of inequality."
Philippe Aghion, Eve Caroli & Cecilia Garcia-Penalosa, "Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories",
Journal of Economic Literature december 1999
4
"[teoriöversikt] At the risk of some oversimplification, the recent literature on income distribution and growth can be divided into three main approaches: the 'fiscal policy', 'socio-political instability', and 'imperfect capital market' approaches. A fourth approach, which deals with the relationship between income distribution on one side and human capital investment and fertility decisions on the other, has not been fully formalized, to the best of my knowledge. /.../
[findings] More equal societies have lower fertility rates and higher rates of investment in education. Both are reflected in higher rates of growth. Also, very unequal societies tend to be politically and socially unstable, which is reflected in lower rates of investment and therefore growth. Finally, the data do not support the idea that more equal societies, particularly those with democratic institutions, grow faster because they generate less demands for redistribution and therefore less distortions."
Roberto Perotti, "Growth, Income Distribution and Democracy: What the Data Say",
Columbia University 1994-95 Discussion Paper Series No. 757
5
"Poverty matters to positive economics because it transforms the way the entire economy works. Arguments for this proposition abound in the development literature. The simplest and most influential is based on the premise that the poor have some behavioral trait that makes them stay poor: poverty is a 'trap.' The fraction of nonpoor in the population then determines the potential for wealth accumulation of the economy; countries with fewer poor will grow faster.
This argument is somewhat unsatisfying because it is not clear that the evident behavioral differences between the poor and everyone else-the poor save less and are
less likely to become entrepreneurs, for example- arise from differences in preferences and abilities or instead from differences in the economic environment.
An insight from the recent literature on incentives is that a similar case can be made without reference to any distinctive behavioral traits of the poor; it relies simply on the fact that the poor are closer to the lower bound on their utility than the rest of the population. Consequently, threats of punishment work less well against the poor than against others: the poor behave as if they have nothing to lose. The poor then find it harder than everyone else to borrow and insure, and that in turn makes them behave differently."
Abhijit V. Banerjee and Andrew F. Newman, "Poverty, Incentives, and Development",
The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 2, maj 1994
6
"Is inequality harmful for growth? We suggest that it is."
Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?",
American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, juni 1994
- papers som dock hävdar att ojämlikhet är bra för tillväxten:
Kristin J Forbes, "A Reassessment of the Relationship Between Inequality and Growth",
American Economic Review september 2001;
Walter Block, "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth", 2001
OECD-LÄNDER IDAG
Jonas Pontusson, "Den nordiska modellen och det sociala Europa",
Arbetsmarknad & Arbetsliv nr 4 2006
data på gini från LIS
data på BNP från OECD
(punkten med högst gini och lägst tillväxt i diagrammet: USA:s 00-tal)
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Uppdatering 20 juli 2011
Mer om inkomstfördelning och ekonomisk utveckling i förindustriella samhällen: Peter Lindert (UC Davis) och Jeffrey Williamson (Harvard) hävdar med nya data att en relativt jämlik inkomstfördelning i USA under den revolutionära perioden ledde till högre tillväxt.
Lindert och Williamson, "
America's Revolution: Economic Disaster, Development, and Equality", voxeu 15 juli
