Aren runt 1980 lanserade Walter Korpi, Michael Shalev och Gøsta Esping-Andersen den sa kallade "maktresursteorin", eller "the power resources approach". Enligt maktresursteorin var välfärdsstaten "ett klassfenomen" (Shalev 1983), formad av klassrelationerna i samhället. Ju starkare arbetarrörelse, desto generösare och mer "dekommodifierande" (Esping-Andersen 1990) välfärdsstat. Vad exakt som ingar i begreppet "maktresurser" har dock alltid varit en aning oklart.
De senaste fem aren har en rad forskare, inte minst statsvetaren Johan Davidsson, använt sig av begreppet "institutional power resources", institutionella maktresurser, för att beskriva facklig styrka. Detta inlägg är en klippsamling pa hur begreppet IPR används pa olika hall. Det verkar ganska enkelt att sammanfatta vad det betyder: facklig inblandning i policymaking, det vill säga ungefär vad som brukar kallas korporatism. Jag är lite förvanad över att inte andra juridiska arbetsmarknadsregleringar som gynnar facken. Men men.
"The theoretical and empirical results that I have presented indicate that if a country nds itself in a situation where pressure groups are strong enough to initiate protests but not strong enough to engage in quid-pro-quo bargaining with the government, there are three potential solutions. The fi rst solution is to weaken pressure groups, which is arguably what Margaret Thatcher's Conservative government did in the United Kingdom in the 1980s. The second solution is to strengthen pressure groups, which is arguably what Austria and the Scandinavian countries did in the midtwentieth century, when governments encouraged further unionization and the formation of strong, centralized union confederations. The third solution is more complicated. As Fearon pointed out in his paper on rationalist explanations for war (1995, 406), it may be possible to solve the commitment problems associated with the transience of de facto power in international politics by transferring the determinants of military power between states. An equivalent solution in domestic politics might be to provide pressure groups with institutional power resources such as a role in the implementation and management of public policy programs, or in negotiations and legislation at the legislative stage." (15-16)
Johannes Lindvall, "Pressure Group Strength and the Politics of Protests" (pdf)
"the reform trajectory in the second period [efter 1970-talet] is determined by whether the social partners, in general, and the unions, in particular, had been able to utilise their stronger influence in the first period [1930-tal till 1970-tal] to cement its position and influence in the area of labour market policy. To put it more clearly, if they had established an institutional role for themselves in the reform and administration of labour market policy, and thereby had created a strong tradition of social partner inclusion more resistant to the pressures in the second period, what will be referred to as “institutional power resources” (IPRs), [ref Korpi 1983] we should expect to see dualisation with regard to labour market policy reform. A consequence of this argument is that the process of dualisation can be skewed if the IPRs were established in one dimension of labour market policy, for example in the unemployment insurance, but not in another, for example employment protection.20 In Sweden, however, such IPRs were established in both of these dimensions."
Johan Davidsson, "Less of an Exception, Less of a Model: Dualisation in the Swedish welfare system, labour market policy after 1990" (pdf)
Chiara Benassi och Tim Vlandas:
"the fact that high bargaining coverage is necessary but not high union density suggests that ‘institutional’ power resources are necessary while ‘organisational’ strength in terms of union members is not."
Chiara Benassi och Tim Vlandas, "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde? Union strategies towards temporary agency workers" (pdf), Paper at the ILERA Conference, Amsterdam, 20-22 June 2013.
Henning Jørgensen och Michaela Schultze:
"Being part of public administrative bodies strengthened the institutional power resources of the unions." (638, de refererar inte till nagon särskild forskare)
Henning Jørgensen and Michaela Schulze, "A double farewell to a former model? Danish unions and activation policy", Local Economy 2012
Melisa Serrano och Ida Regalia:
"Hypothesis 4: Where institutional anchors of union power and strength exist (like in coordinated market economies), union renewal mainly focuses on regaining or reconfiguring these institutional power resources. Where there is very limited or absence of institutional props of union power and influence (like in liberal market economies), union renewal focuses mainly on increasing membership density and mobilizing external resources of influence (e.g. coalition-building with social movements). As highlighted in the IG Metall case study, the union’s renewal strategy focused on the following: ‘converting’ works councils into ‘organizing agents’; defending sectoral collective bargaining by controlling its deregulation to the firm level; and to effectively address this, activating members at the shop-floor by involving them in workplace negotiations and in the recruitment of new members. In effect, IG Metall’s renewal and organizing strategy is a combination of institutional revitalization and membership activism."
Melisa Serrano och Ida Regalia, "Between Accommodation and Transformation: The Contending Logics of Union Renewal in CAW and IG Metall", 2012
Davidsson och Emmenegger:
"The institutionalised roles of unions in the formulation of labour market reform and the administration of dismissals are what we refer to as ‘institutional power resources’. The concept denotes the power resources that become the property of organisations as a result of their ability to hold on to these institutions (Davidsson 2011a).
Unions' institutional role in the formulation of political reform, which can be either formal or informal, allows them to influence legislation. For instance, France has a long tradition of letting unions and employers pre-negotiate new legislation. This tradition was formalised in law in 2007. Before introducing new job security legislation, the government is now required to put the issue to negotiation between unions and employers. If they reach an agreement, the government is directed to base the new legislation on this agreement (Davidsson 2011a).
The unions' institutional role in the administration of dismissals allows them to negotiate the compensation of workers in the form of redundancy pay and training measures, represent dismissed workers in court, and protect union delegates against dismissals. Typically, the unions' administrative role is linked to the legislation on open-ended contracts. For instance, in Sweden, the ‘last in, first out’ principle contained in the job security legislation for open-ended contracts is optional in the sense that derogations to the principle can be negotiated between unions and employers. This gives unions the opportunity to bargain for compensation. The position of unions as a bargaining partner also makes it possible for them to protect union delegates against dismissals. In France, in case of collective dismissals for economic reasons, union delegates have the right to be informed and consulted by the employers, including the establishment of social plans. In addition, unions have the right to question the social plan by inviting an external accountant. French unions also have the right to represent workers in legal proceedings and to take employers to court for not having followed regulations contained in the relevant legislation or collective agreements (Davidsson 2011a).
Johan Bo Davidsson och Patrick Emmenegger, "Defending the organisation, not the members: Unions and the reform of job security legislation in Western Europe", European Journal of Political Research 2012.
Arbetsmarknadsforskarna Susanna Pernicka och Vera Glassner använder begreppet IPR delvis annorlunda:
Arbetsmarknadsforskarna Susanna Pernicka och Vera Glassner använder begreppet IPR delvis annorlunda:
"Institutional power – derives from regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive elements and practices inherent in institutions that support trade union action. Moreover, institutions can also weaken trade union power. In such cases we refer to institutions as negative institutional power. Drawing on McAdam and Scott’s (2005) and Scott’s (1995, 2008) general framework of institutions, we differentiate between two components of institutional power, institutional logics (which relates to the cultural-cognitive dimension of institutions) and governance systems (which relates to the regulative and normative dimension):Pernicka och Glassner, "Transnational trade union strategies in the field of European wage policy The role of institutional power sources and institutional work in European wage coordination" (pdf), working paper, 2012
H 2a: Institutional logics are defined as the belief systems, conceptions (including a common language) and associated practices that shape cognitions and behaviours and hence organisational structures and strategies. Dominant institutional logics are assumed to reflect the consensus of powerful actors, such as market logic that empowers multi-national business against labour in European fields of industrial relations. In contrast, secondary or repressed logics represent other, subordinated interests, such as the logic of cooperation of trade unions in organisational fields where policies of deregulation and marketisation prevail.
H 2b: Governance structures refer to those arrangements by which field-level power and authority are exercised in support (or to the detriment) of trade unions, involving regulative and normative mechanisms such as free collective bargaining, co-determination laws, trade unions’ political participation at macro-level (Sozialpartnerschaft) or existing strike laws in the U.K. as an example for negative institutional power."