lördag 7 juli 2012

Korporatism, fack och migrationspolitik

Rinus Penninx och Judith Roosblaad (2000) lanserade teorin att fackens grad av involvering i den nationella politiken - vi kan kalla detta korporatism eller 'institutional embeddedness' - i hög grad påverkar vilka strategier de kommer att välja gentemot migrantarbetare. Mer inblandade - mindre intresse av att intressera migrantarbetare, menade Penninx och Roosblad. Denna hypotes används ofta i forskningen, och jag ska här kolla på hur stor effekt några nyare studier finner för den.

Bucken-Knapp 2007
 "VoC scholars maintain that policymakers prefer reforms conforming to the national political economy, improving firm capacity and ensuring better economic performance. /.../ My analysis shows that while the SAP backed labor migration policies compatible with the Swedish coordinated market economy, it did not do so for reasons of efficiency or economic performance. The SAP fears that liberal reform, preferred by employers, will damage the Swedish model, undermine active labor market policies and weaken unions. The case of Swedish labor migration policy underscores how economic reform reflects political conflict and not the desire to preserve equilibrium."

Torben Krings, 2009:
"Generally, trade unions in the industrialized world have ambivalent attitudes towards migrant labour that can be situated ‘on a continuum rang ing from exclusion to inclusion’ (Kahmann, 2006: 186). Despite a
tradition of international solidarity, unions are embedded in particular national societies and tend to represent primarily the interest of their national memberships (Penninx and Roosblad, 2000). Historically, they were often hostile towards the inflow of migrant labour, as a surplus of workers exerts downward pressure on wages (Goldthorpe, 1984). Furthermore, the recruitment of workers from abroad adds not only to the quantitative supply of labour but also brings about qualitative change: the workforce becomes more fragmented with language and cultural differences, and, it has to be said, racism to which the labour movement was no stranger in the past (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Miles and Phizacklea, 1992)." (s 50)

"It is often assumed that trade unions today would favour restrictive policies, as structural unemployment has become a feature of many West European countries (Penninx and Roosblad, 2000). However, some
writers have recently challenged this ‘conventional wisdom’ (Watts, 2002: 1) by arguing that in the light of globalization and the transnationalization of labour markets, unions are not necessarily predisposed towards restrictionism. As unions acknowledge that the movement of people is an inextricable part of the ‘global age’, they increasingly view restrictive migration policies as neither desirable nor feasible. Instead, greater emphasis is placed on the organization of migrants to preserve employment conditions (Haus, 2002; Milkman, 2006; Watts, 2002). These studies, however, are mainly confined to Mediterranean countries and the USA, which somewhat limits the generalizability of the argument." (s 50f)

"German and Austrian unions were the strongest supporters of a transitional period, arguing that their labour markets would be unable to cope with an unregulated inflow of migrants in the light of their current economic difficulties, geographical proximity and the significant wage gap with the NMSs." (s 55)

"from a trade union perspective the outcome of the transitional regimes in Austria and Germany has been mixed. While it is likely that the restrictions have diverted some migration flows to the UK and Ireland, they may have contributed to an increase in the posting of workers, ‘bogus’ self-employment and the informal economy. Indeed, some DGB officials argued that such temporary migration, often in precarious conditions, is best opposed by enabling NMS workers to migrate through the free movement of labour." (S 57)

"it was not labour shortage alone that led unions to support an open labour market policy. In particular, the British TUC has over the years not only adopted robust anti-discrimination policies but has also increasingly opposed restrictive immigration policies (Avci and McDonald, 2000; Wrench, 2004). It therefore took a principled stance in favour of free movement of labour." (s 58)

"When Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007, the British and Irish governments changed their previous open labour market policy and imposed transitional arrangements. Although the TUC welcomed the announcement by the British government to become more active in pursuing the enforcement of labour standards with regard to ‘rogue employers’, they disagreed with the restrictions, arguing that such measures
would make workers more vulnerable to exploitation (TUC, 2006). Individual British unions argued similarly. According to one TGWU official, ‘our concern is that this would encourage the grey economy where workers, driven away from legitimate access to the workplace, would resort to other ways of keeping themselves together’. Similarly, the construction union UCATT expressed concerns about an increase in ‘bogus’ self-employment, which is already widespread in the sector, and demanded ‘employment rights’ for Bulgarian and Romanian workers (UCATT, 2007)." (s 59)

"Penninx and Roosblad (2000) have identified four possible factors that may explain differences in trade union attitudes to labour migration: the labour market context, unions’ institutional position, national identity and ideology and the broader perception of immigration in society." (s 60)

"there is a strong view that in an open economy like the UK, labour standards are best protected by improved compliance rather than by restrictions. /.../
Such a more inclusive stance on immigration and ‘race’ appears to be linked to a loss of union influence particularly during the time of the Thatcher government. In the words of John Wrench (2004: 21), ‘as membership and power declined, it was increasingly recognized that the future of trade unionism dependent on a more inclusive strategy which took seriously the problems and interests of previously marginalized groups’." (s 60f)

"Although unions regained some influence since the return of Labour to power in 1997, they remain in a comparatively weak institutional position (Thelen, 2001). This is shown particularly in terms of a decline in collective bargaining coverage (see Table 2). As centralized bargaining has virtually collapsed, the bargaining position of unions very much depends on their organizational strength (Frege and Kelly, 2004). It is against this background that the TUC and some individual unions have moved towards an ‘organising unionism’ (Heery et al., 2000) aiming to reach out to previously untapped sections of the labour force, including black and ethnic minority workers and more recent migrants. From this perspective, restrictions for NMS migrants may appear an impediment to a more proactive organizing approach and may channel migrants into the already growing informal economy, bearing in mind that only access to labour markets, not freedom of movement as such, can be restricted for citizens from the accession countries.
Although unions in Austria, Germany and Ireland have also experienced a considerable decline in membership density, they remain more institutionally entrenched: collective agreements still cover a majority of all employees, and systems of social partnership allow unions some formal involvement in the socio-economic decision-making process. Hence, if it is true that ‘the primary institutional influence on patterns
of union behaviour is the structure of collective bargaining’ (Clegg, 1976), then it appears that continuous coordinated bargaining in these countries has so far provided less of an incentive for unions to put a greater emphasis on organizing. In turn, in Britain the collapse of traditional bargaining institutions and a loss in union influence under the Conservative governments propelled unions into rethinking traditional union strategies, not least in terms of organizing new groups of ‘atypical’ employees. This has contributed to a re-appraisal of union strategies towards more marginalized groups such as migrant workers.
Thus, the institutional position of unions appears to be of some importance. It is necessary, however, to point out that unions that are in a similar institutional position do not respond uniformly to labour migration. During the Gastarbeiter era, both Austrian and German unions had a considerable input into government policies; but while the former pursued a protectionist immigration policy (Gächter, 2000), the latter eventually became ‘the major institutional force for integration, in the absence of adequate government policies’ (Penninx and Roosblad, 2000: 197). Thus, as with labour market factors, the institutional position of unions has only limited explanatory value on its own. This is where other contextual factors can provide a more sensitive
explanation." (s 61f)

"Another important difference is the changing regulatory context of inward migration. During the earlier decades, unions agreed to immigration on the assumption that ‘organized capitalism’ would prevent it  undermining established pay and working conditions. After the deregulation of labour markets and the weakening of organized labour, unions increasingly struggle to secure ‘equal pay for equal work’. This has been made more difficult by an increase in the posting of workers and subcontracting arrangements during which migrants cannot be integrated in the workforce on an equal par with domestic workers (Hunger, 2000). It is against this background that German (and Austrian) unions feared that an inflow of NMS migrants would undermine labour standards and collective agreements, already under strain with the shift in the balance of power between capital and labour." (s 62)

offentlig debatt och nationell historia påverkar fackets val (s 61ff)

"Evidently no single factor can account for the variations in trade union policies on labour migration. Instead, national contextual factors lead to different outcomes. Thus, in spite of parallel developments such as European integration, economic internationalization and an increase in immigration, domestic political, economic and institutional factors continue to be decisive in shaping these policies." (s 63)

"The thesis of a change in trade union migration policy perhaps best applies to Britain where the trade union movement has adopted a policy position that is broadly in favour of the free movement of labour. This confirms the assumption that union movements with less political clout are more inclined to put greater emphasis on the organization of migrant workers as ‘an alternative strategy to restrictionism for improving wages and work conditions’ (Haus, 2002: 7)." (s 64)

"From a trade union perspective, individual immigration during which migrants become integrated into the workforce of the host country, and indeed wider society, seems to be preferable to the temporary posting of workers under the EU freedom of services. However, in the light of the planned further liberalization of service markets, the provision of services across borders is likely to increase." (s 64)

"unions have to engage more actively with migrants and explore more innovative ways of organizing them. There is already some evidence of this. The British TGWU, for instance, has modelled its ‘Justice for Cleaners’ campaign closely after the successful ‘Justice for Janitors’ campaign in Los Angeles, with an organizing approach that focuses on occupations across the lowpaid sector and involves some extra-workplace activity like linking up with migrant communities (Milkman, 2006). Another recent initiative includes the foundation of the European Migrant Workers Union by the German IG BAU that specifically aims to organize migrant  workers who are posted abroad and who often are in a particular vulnerable situation (Dribbusch, 2004). To be sure, the organization of migrants, particularly if the latter see their stay as only temporary, will not prove to be an easy task for trade unions. However, in times of the transnationalization of labour markets, membership decline and an increase in casualized, nonstandard forms of work, unions have few alternatives than to represent more actively the increasingly mobile ‘birds of passage’ of the 21st century." (s 65)

Stefania Marino, 2012:
"A second influential variable is the union’s institutional embeddedness, that is its position within, and influence on, the socio-economic policy making process. On the one hand, institutional embeddedness is the result of several institutional factors that may facilitate or hinder union involvement in national policy making. On the other, it is the result of state and employer strategies (Geary, 1981; Poole, 1986) which can either guarantee or deny ‘institutional recognition’ to trade unions. Migration scholars regard the position occupied in the national decision-making process as a key variable in explaining union actions towards migrant workers (Penninx and Roosblad, 2000; Vranken, 1990). In this respect, Penninx and Roosblad (2000: 14) state that ‘the more powerful a trade union is, the more effectively it will be able to steer government policy related to immigration in a direction favourable to the union’. However, the two scholars do not find any causal relation between a stronger or weaker ‘power position’ and the ‘direction’ of union action towards migrant workers. Yet research findings suggest an inverse relationship between union institutional embeddedness and union efforts to include migrant and ethnic minority workers. The institutionally embedded FNV increased its efforts to organize migrant and ethnic minority workers soon after the deadlock in social dialogue in 2004. In the Italian case, the anti-union attitudes of the centre-right administration and the rupture of inter-union unity strengthened the existing actions of CGIL to include migrant workers. The stable engagement in corporatist processes may also explain the stronger influence of external changes on Dutch union attitudes and the limitation of union initiatives to employment issues. As Penninx and Roosblad (2000: 196) explain, ‘those unions which are strongly committed to common socio-economic decision-making have tied their hands much more, and tend to stick more closely to the core activity of trade unions’. However, institutional embeddedness only partially accounts for the different extent of the speech-action gap. In the Dutch case, for instance, the implementation gap persisted even after 2005, when FNV increased its attention to migrant issues. In this respect, differences are better explained by internal union variables and dynamics." (s 15)
ytterligare viktiga variabler:
facklig struktur (s 15f)
facklig ideologi (s 16)
facklig identitet (s 17)
ekonomisk konjunktur

I frågan om determinism, se också Marino och Roosblad (2008, s 628):
"As underlined by Frege and Kelly (2003), industrial relations scholars often consider strategic union choices as not only influenced but even determined by exogenous factors (Clegg 1976; Poole 1986; Geary 1981). But scholars focusing more on trade union independence in the choosing process have also highlighted the influence of economic and labour market dynamics. For instance, Frege and Kelly (2003) consider them as independent variables in their model of union strategic choices"
"Visser, addressing the Dutch case, affirms:
by enhancing the institutional security of unions and their leaders, and by establishing
a quasi-monopoly of union representation corporatism intentionally diminishes
the need for unions to prove their strength through mobilization and lowers
the political and organization incentives for union recruitment. (Visser 1986;
Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999: 145)
This belief is confirmed by comparative research on union revitalisation strategies in the US, the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain during 2000-2004. According to the study, unions that adopt the organising strategy are characterised by poor institutional embeddedness and weak influence on policy-making (Frege and Kelly 2003)." (ibid)

"our findings suggest a relationship between the degree of institutional embeddedness and union perception of migrant and ethnic minority inclusion as either ‘threat’ or ‘opportunity’ (Frege and Kelly, 2003). More inclusive stances coincide either with the rupture of social dialogue, as in the Dutch case, or with periods of more antagonistic relations with government, employers and other unions, as in Italy. Institutionally embedded trade unions thus perceive migrant worker unionization and participation as less relevant for organizational strength (Baccaro et al., 2003; Regalia, 1988; Visser, 1998; Wrench, 2004)." (s 18)

"Our findings thus indicate that despite similar contextual challenges and sectoral contexts, trade unions can opt for very different strategic choices. Such strategies, as well as the extent to which they are implemented and, to a large extent, their outcomes strongly depend on internal union variables and dynamics." (s 18)

Både Krings och Marino finner stöd för Penninx och Roosblads 'institutional embeddedness'-argument, även om ingen av dem hävdar att detta är den enda faktorn som avgör.


Gregg Bucken-Knapp, "VoC and Labor Migration Policy", 2007
Torben Krings, "A Race to the Bottom? Trade Unions, EU Enlargement and the Free Movement of Labour", European Journal of Industrial Relations 2009

Stefania Marino, "Trade union inclusion of migrant and ethnic minority workers: Comparing Italy and the Netherlands", European Journal of Industrial Relations nr 1 2012
Stefania Marino och Judith Roosblad, "Migration and trade unions: A comparison between Dutch and Italian trade union actions and strategies", Transfer vinter 2008

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