Finsk lönebildning i en nordisk kontext

De finska arbetsmarknadsforskarna Joel Kaitila, Ville-Pekka Sorsa och Antti Alaja börjar en ny artikel om den finska lönebildningen med att beskriva de idébaserade förklaringarnas ökade inflytande inom arbetsmarknadsforskningen (Industrial Relations). Så här ger de rappt en litteraturöversikt:

"Ideational framings have been observed to influence perceptions and the legitimacy of IR (Cradden, 2014), shape wage regulation preferences and strategies (Boumans, 2021), and necessitate and legitimize changes in wage policy (McLaughlin and Wright, 2018). Most ideational research has focused on either the micro-level of analysis – that is, the contribution of ideas to shaping the form, dynamics and products of the employment relationship (Hauptmeier and Heery, 2014) – or the macro-level of analysis – that is, the ideas constitutive of IR regimes and contribution of ideas to long-term incremental change (Boumans, 2021; Howell, 2019). Few studies have adopted a meso-level approach to examine the use of ideas in specific wage regulation and policy processes (see McLaughlin and Wright, 2018). The research thus far has focused mostly on the context of liberal market economies (McLaughlin and Wright, 2018)."

Deras empiriska bidrag är att studera den finska "konkurrenskraftspakten" (Competitiveness Pact/
Kilpailukykysopimus) från 2016. Denna pakt var ett led i återcentraliseringen av finsk lönebildning, en motsatt trend mot övriga Norden där lönebildningen decentraliserats på 2010-talet*, vilket gör det särskilt intressant att utforska drivkrafterna bakom 2016 års uppgörelse. 2007-11 tog Finland steg mot decentralisering, men i lönerundorna 2011, 2013 och 2016 gick man tillbaka till mer centrala förhandlingar, medan den helt centrala nivån avbröts 2017 när arbetsgivarorganisationen tog bort ur sina stadgar mandatet att förhandla centralt. Intressebaserade förklaringar till skiften i arbetsgivarnas politik har fokuserat på exportindustrins drivande roll för decentralisering på 2000-talet (Bergholm och Bieler 2013). Så här ramar Kaitila, Sorsa och Alaja in sin fallstudie i relation till litteraturen:

"While these factors in combination may explain the longer-term macro-level regime shift, they provide, at best, a partial explanation for the temporary reintroduction of central bargaining in 2011–2016 and, consequently, the deviation from the Nordic trajectory. Thus far, the elastic commitment to central bargaining in Finland has been attributed to the tradition of using existing institutions pragmatically to achieve economic policy goals (Andersen et al., 2015). The idea of national competitiveness was revamped in the 2010s to emphasize labour cost reduction at the expense of sectoral flexibility and investment policies (Kaitila, 2019). Simultaneously, the interest constellation of the Finnish business system became tripolarized, and wage policy interests increasingly diverged between global service and technology companies pursuing ‘upward’ competition, export industries pursuing ‘downward’ competition and domestic service companies pursuing purchase power increases (Sorsa, 2020). Thus, it remains unlikely that a one-size-fits-all cost reduction would be perceived as a pragmatic instrument by any majority. External institutional pressures from the Eurozone appear to have had little impact on the Finnish wage policy and regulation of that time (Dølvik et al., 2018)." (s. 474)

Idéer spelar roll för arbetsmarknadens institutioner, säger de: t ex "when influential actors succeed in producing and disseminating ideas that bear reform imperatives, other actors’ perceptions of interests typically change". (s. 475)** Sådana förändringar kan vara kortsiktiga, säger de lite ogenomskinligt, men "New frames and beliefs are necessary for justifying aspired institutional changes; therefore, ideas are needed as ‘blueprints for institutional reform’ (Blyth, 2002)." (s. 475) Och så här ramar de in sin forskning om idéer på meso-nivån, som är distinkt från makro-nivån:

"While macro-level ideational analyses focus on collective paradigms and micro-level
analyses on individual-level cognition, the appropriate research object at the meso-level is ideation. Here, the focus is on the ideas framing each decision-making instance and what emerges therefrom as new ideas or rearticulations and reframings of old ideas (Kamkhaji and Radaelli, 2022). In policy processes, ideas are typically pushed by exogenous inputs and feedback and often create new processes of ideation where thought structures are recreated and contextually reshaped. Ideas can be used as heuristics and strategic tools (Swinkels, 2020), which are typically used to construct policy problems and solutions, create reform imperatives and connect interests and/or legitimize policy prescriptions to form coalitions (Beland, 2009; Beland and Cox, 2016)." (s. 475)

Deras fallstudiestrategi är att studera ett "deviant case", "an appropriate case study strategy for disconfirming deterministic arguments and probing new explanations (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). In this case, we probe meso-level ideational explanations for temporary shifts in wage regulation and policy that deviate from ongoing institutional change processes and publicly articulated interests,
respectively." (s. 476)  Så här presenterar de sin metod och källorna som de använt:

"To analyse how ideas may explain the deviant process and its outcomes, we constructed a process description of the negotiations, mapped out key instances of ideation, recognized puzzles requiring an ideational explanation and mapped out the framings and reframings produced in ideation. We used the extensive reporting by Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Finland’s largest newspaper, as our primary material. The timeline of the process spanned from April 2015, when the newly elected government presented its first demands for central bargaining, to the signing of the final pact in June 2016. We searched the HS database using the string Yhteiskuntasopimus (‘The Social Pact’, the term used by the media) from April 2015 to March 2016. Next, we used the string Kilpailukykysopimus, the official title of the 29 February 2016 agreement. The retrieved HS materials comprised 1017 articles in total. We supplemented these materials with publicly available official reform documentation (cited in the next section) to widen our materials on frames brought to each ideation session. These materials included references to policy programmes, expert reports and other documents that the government employed in the negotiations." (s. 476)

Metoden specifierar de som "the ideational outcome process tracing analysis method developed by Vanhala and Hestbaek (2016) for negotiation settings" -- intressant nog kommer metoden från ett ganska annorlunda fält, studier av global klimatpolitik.

Förhandlingsprocessen började när en ny regering, ledd av Centerpartiets Juha Sipilä och med Koalitionspartiet och Sannfinnländarna som koalitionspartners, tillträdde 2015. Sipilä bjöd in arbetsmarknadens parter att förhandla om en social pakt för tre mål: internationell konkurrenskraft, BNP-tillväxten, och jobbskapandet. Regeringen satte som första mål att minska arbetskostnaderna med 5 procent genom att öka den årliga arbetstiden med 100 timmar utan lönekompensation. Genom att vilja gå genom tripartistiska förhandlingar bröt Sipilä med den tidigare Stubbregeringens policy att hålla facken utanför. Det blir ett puzzle för forskningen att förklara varför den borgerliga regeringen 2015 gick in i centraliserade förhandlingar, tvärtemot tidigare politik och formulerade mål. (s. 478) 

Finska LO, SAK, protesterade mot regeringens agenda, och fas två av förhandlingarna började hösten 2015. I september hotade regeringen med att helt enkelt, om ingen uppgörelse kunde nås, genomföra reformer (om semester, sjukledighet och övertidsbetalning) som skulle sänka arbetskostnaderna med 5 procent. Facken svarade med strejker och demonstrationer, men SAK presenterade också ett motförslag för att sänka arbetskostnaderna med 4,2 procent genom en centraliserad pakt till 2018 med frysta löner m m. Arbetsgivarna presenterade ett förslag på central pakt med sänkta indirekta arbetskostnader, men utan centrala förhandlingar om lönepolitiken i sig. Regeringen förhandlade i oktober och december utifrån SAK:s förslag och vintern 2015-16 fördes hårda förhandlingar.

Den tredje fasen av förhandlingar började med att arbetsgivarna och facken förberedde ett provisoriskt avtal i slutet av februari 2016. "The interests and positions of different parties had been clearly articulated throughout the long negotiation process, which enabled rapid progress. The provisional agreement was built around a wage freeze, other labour cost reductions and an uncompensated increase in work time." (s. 480) Det politiska spelet här handlade bl.a. om vilka fackförbund som skulle skriva på, och NKP och Företagarnas (FE) försök att decentralisera löneförhandlingarna genom pakten.

I analysen börjar Kaitila et al med att hävda att genom förhandlingsprocessen skapades (eller frilagdes?) en

"frame that we call the economic outlook (hereinafter EO). Overall, the EO created a strong imperative to resolve the perceived competitiveness and fiscal problems in tandem and prescribed labour cost moderation in its various guises as the key policy tool for overcoming a perceived crisis. The EO created situational awareness among the negotiating parties that allowed them to recognize shared interests and justify unpopular measures and compromises, and it was used as a discursive weapon to commit other parties to an uncertain and often frustrating negotiation process. Moreover, the EO became an institutional fact during the negotiation process: no labour market organization leader or politician could neglect it or the implied need to moderate labour costs to return to Finland’s earlier levels of competitiveness without being perceived in the media as part of the problem rather than its solution." (s. 480-1)

Den första idén som var en del av EO var "konkurrenskraftskrisen". Den andra idén var "the ‘sustainability gap’ (kestavyysvaje)", introducerad av Finansdepartementet 2007.

EO:s roll i förhandlingarna förklarar de förvånande mönstren i hur förhandlingarna gick och deras resultat, menar Kaitila et al. Idén om en pågående konkurrenskraftskris förklarar varför regeringen kunde gå in på ett program om centrala förhandlingar, mot NKP:s tidigare hållning. Facket kunde i sin tur gå med på lönesänkningar eftersom de fick sina preferenser vad gällde centraliserade förhandlingar. (s. 482-483)

referens
Joel Kaitila, Ville-Pekka Sorsa och Antti Alaja (2022) "The power of the economic outlook: An ideational explanation of the distinct pattern of Finnish wage setting within the Nordic context", European Journal of Industrial Relations Vol. 28(4) 471–490.

 

fotnoter

* Mer detaljerat beskriver de den nordiska bakgrunden så här: "Wage flexibility and price competitiveness replaced fair distribution and wage growth as the main norms driving wage policy. Wage regulation was gradually decentralized in an organized manner and, depending on the country, shifted to either the local/company level or sectoral or industry level. The importance of the local bargaining component in wage determination grew. Bi- and tripartite bargaining became more a coordinator and/or regulator of decentralized wage policy than a policymaking arena (Andersen et al., 2015). Especially in the Nordic countries these transformations occurred in different guises and at varying paces but amounted to comprehensive reconfigurations of labour market institutions, (Dølvik et al., 2018)." (s. 473)

** Mer detaljerat förklarar de sin approach så här: "In this paper, we focus on ideas that justified the use of exhausting institutional resources and enabled different parties to find common ground in the CoPa policy process. Explaining an individual policy process and its outcomes necessitates a meso-level analysis. A meso-level policy analysis examines a specific policy programme and all the factors framing and giving shape to the policy process. In the context of IR
scholarship, this entails analysing the wage policy and regulation process emerging from the macro-level IR regime. We focus on how ideas were used, interests were articulated and institutional resources were mobilized through them in the negotiation process to form proposals and positions, coalitions and break-ups, consensus and dissensus and, eventually, the wage policy and regulation measures constituting the CoPa." (s. 475)