Vad har hänt med korporatismen i Europa sedan 1970? Eller rättare sagt, vad har hänt med korporatismen i nio stycken mindre länder i nordvästra Europa? Över detta ger den nederländske statsvetaren Jaap Woldendorp en översikt i hans paper "Corporatism in small north-west European countries 1970-2006". De nio länder som han kollar på är Österrike, Belgien, Danmark, Finland, Irland, Nederländerna, Norge, Sverige och Schweiz. Tillvägagångsättet är berättande och baserat på litteraturen. Huvudresultatet är att det finns tre grupperingar vad gäller korporatismens liv och leverne. I sex länder har korporatismen bestått, med vissa upp- och nedgångar: Österrike, Danmark, Finland, Nederländerna, Norge och Schweiz. I två länder har graden av korporatism tydligt minskat: Belgien och Sverige. Och i ett land har korporatismen gjort framsteg: Irland.
Den allmänna bilden av korporatismens utveckling torde vara den om en omvandling från "klassisk" korporatism på 1970-talet till "competitive" (Martin 2000, Rhodes 2001), "lean" (Traxler 2004) eller "utbudsside-" (Hassel och Ebbinghaus 2000) sedan 1990-talet, i takt med fackföreningsrörelsens och vänsterpartiernas försvagning.
Några guldklimpar ur Woldendorps text:
"In the 1990s the requirements to qualify for the EMU became the central issue for generalised political exchange of wage moderation for a host of active labour market policies and negotiated changes in the welfare state (entitlements and benefits – e.g., Hancké and Rhodes 2005; Hassel 2006; Natali and Pochet 2009; Ahlquist 2010). After introduction of the Euro, the Stability and Growth Pact continued this setting for generalised political exchange in the 2000s (e.g., Acocella et al. 2009).
In Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland sooner or later and with more or less agreements between government and social partners this generalised political exchange took effect in the 1990s. In Belgium and Sweden this political exchange was largely imposed on social partners by the government. In Belgium due to the process of federalisation and decentralisation to the linguistic communities (Keman 2008; Deschouwer 2006; Kuipers 2006: 55-57; Hemerijck and Visser 2000), whereas in Sweden from the early 1980s the employers refused to cooperate with the trade unions and (social democratic) government (Lindvall and Sebring 2005; Blom-Hansen 2000). Irish corporatism, lastly, is relatively new. /.../ Due to the high influx of foreign direct investment (and European funds) in the 1990s the
government was able to compensate wage moderation with tax reductions (and other public policies) and at the same time collect sufficient taxes to reduce deficits and debt (Teague and Donaghey 2009; Roche 2007; see also Baccaro and Lim 2007; Baccaro and Simoni 2007; Hassel and Ebbinghaus 2000: 4)." (s 4f, min fetning)
"in Denmark and the Netherlands, corporatist institutions were restructured in
the area of social security implementation (the Netherlands) or labour market and industrial policy (Denmark) and government and social partners had to contend with some severe downturns and rather persistent or recurring government deficits and public debt. Corporatist policy formation itself ran into difficulties as well. In both countries, trade unions had difficulty to adapt to changing macroeconomic circumstances which spilled over into recurrent unsuccessful corporatist exchange. Governments took a leading role in the process of corporatist exchange, in particular in times of economic adversity. In addition, the employers in Denmark
were instrumental in saving corporatist policy formation. And in both countries corporatist exchange benefited from the macroeconomic context of the ‘miracles’ in the late 1990s." (s 13, min fetning)
"Unlike their Swedish counterparts, Danish employers rebuilt relations with trade unions in the following years and kept corporatist policy formation in Denmark going, albeit in a more decentralised fashion than before. Employers internally (re)centralised their input in decentralised wage bargaining and with some delay the trade unions followed suit (Jochem 2003: 115, 130-132; Martin and Thelen 2007: 21-22).
In the 1990s, employment became the new central issue for corporatist exchange. Although until the 1990s, the Danish model of corporatism had given social partners considerable autonomy in employment regulation by bilateral negotiations without government intervention, in the 1990s successive (minority) governments abandoned their customary passive attitude towards labour market policy and embarked upon active labour market policies (Jochem 2003: 130-132; Lind 2000: 137 ff.; see also Falkner and Leiber 2004). From 1995 macroeconomic performance took a turn for the better as well, and economic and employment growth increased, inflation decreased, the budgets became balanced: a Danish miracle had appeared (Green-Pedersen and Lindbom 2005). Corporatist policy formation featuring active labour market policies, combined with moderate real wage increases (due to low inflation) continued both on the decentral and on the national level as was shown by the national agreements on wage policy in 1995, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007 (Due and Green Madsen 2008; Dølvik 2007)." (s 19)
"Swiss national government does not as a rule intervene in industrial relations but determines the legislative framework and lays down the general (national) rules for collective bargaining on sub-national levels (Woldendorp 1997: 66). Like in the Netherlands and in Sweden, employers associations are stronger and much more centralised than trade unions (Oesch 2007). Collective bargaining on the sectoral level can be characterised as patternsetting (akin to Germany and Sweden since 1997)." (s 16)
DK på 1970-talet:
"When no collective agreements could be reached, as in 1975, 1977 and 1979, the
government took over incomes policy and dictated new collective agreements. And even
when agreements were struck wage moderation was not achieved because of lacking trade
union discipline that was rooted in the same increasing union density. As a consequence, government deficits increased (public sector wages) as did unemployment (Woldendorp 1997: 66-67; Lind 2000: 137)."
"at the end of the 1970s escalating government deficits and debt induced
christian democratic – liberal coalition governments to develop austerity measures to reduce the rapid increase of government expenditure." (s 21)
1990-2005 höjdpunkten för korporatistiskt utbyte i Nederländerna. 2003-05 uttalade wage moderation-avtal (s 22).
Finland: "Unlike Switzerland, devaluation of the currency was the preferred policy instrument for macroeconomic adjustment to the world market, as it was in Sweden and Belgium as well (Woldendorp 1997: 67; Grote and Schmitter 2003: 285; Kauppinen 2000: 163-164)." (s 24)
Norges 00-tal: "Despite the dominant central trade union organisation’s commitment to moderate wage bargaining, its rank-and-file as well as some of the other trade union organisations struck for higher bargains which fuelled inflation. Rising inflation induced the Norwegian Central Bank to up interest rates in 2002, causing rapidly increasing unemployment in 2002 and 2003. This in turn triggered the next round of tripartite negotiations on a fourth emergency program (Dølvik 2007)." (s 26)
Belgien: "tripartite national corporatist policy formation was partially revived after 1998. Based on the 1996 Law for ‘the promotion of employment and preventive safeguarding of competitiveness’, the Central Economic Council (CEC) sets national guidelines for incomes policy using wage cost data from the country’s immediate neighbours Germany, France and the Netherlands. The aim is to achieve wage moderation, i.e. a wage cost level below these competitors (Pochet 2004). Between 1998 and 2004 and again between 2006 and 2008 social partners succeeded in concluding national agreements on incomes policy because government reduced social security contributions as part of the exchange. Between 2004 and 2006 social partners could not come to an agreement (the socialist union refused) as government
was not prepared or able to assist corporatist exchange by reducing social security contributions. Consequently, government implemented the CEC wage norm unilaterally." (s 29f)
Sverige: "In the early 1970s social democratic minority government induced trade unions to apply voluntary and coordinated wage restraint by offering an extensive compensatory program of social reforms, including wage earner funds." (s 30)
- är detta att övertolka vad som görs för wage restraint? Kan man verkligen se löntagarfonderna som kompensation till facket för WR? tenderar korporatismforskare att se alla arbetarvänliga reformer som delar av ett (implicit?) korporatistiskt utbyte?
"After the collapse of centralised coordinated wage bargaining in the early 1980s, the government first attempted to revive coordination, but from 1985 government ceased efforts to coordinate wage policy with trade unions and employers associations. Uncoordinated wage policies on the sectoral levels resulted in a strong wage growth that led to a sharp decline of employment in the early 1990s when Sweden experienced its deepest economic crisis since the 1930s Depression. In 1991, the employers association also withdrew all its representatives from the boards of all corporatist agencies, and, more importantly, next ceased to continue to coordinate (sectoral) wage bargaining at the side of employers. In the 1990s, wage drift continued and contributed to low growth rates, whereas inflation remained high (Jochem 2003: 115, 123-125; Blom-Hansen 2000: 158; Dølvik and Martin 2000: 297; see also Falkner and Leiber 2004; Dølvik 2007).
In 1997, under strong pressure from the government and in a context of economic recovery social partners agreed to reintroduce a certain measure of coordination in wage bargaining again. The German system of pattern-setting bargaining was introduced (see also Switzerland). The (exporting) manufacturing sector was to set the norm for other sectors. Employers agreed to this renewed (partial) coordination after decentralised bargaining in 1995 and 1996 had resulted in high wage rises as the forest industry emerged as the leading sector for collective agreements. The international sector had great difficulty in meeting the agreed wage rises (Martin and Thelen 2007: 6-7)." (s 31f)
- jo, Industriavtalet med följande institutionalisering är ett regimskifte (bloggat här, här).
"Like in the Netherlands and Switzerland, a few large (multinational) export corporations dominate the employers association. To protect their competitiveness these employers favoured the introduction of pattern-setting coordination of wage bargaining." (s 32)
Jaap Woldendorp, "Corporatism in small north-west European countries 1970-2006: Business as usual, decline, or a new phenomenon?", Working Paper, Department of Political Science, VU University Amsterdam, februari 2011