En tio år gammal artikel är gammal: Sverige har en statlig lönepolitik

Jag kollar igenom en av de artiklar som jag undervisar på, inför morgondagens föreläsning: Uppsala-statsvetaren Nils Elvanders (1928-2006) "The Labour Market Regimes in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Analysis" från 2002. Och jag inser att tiden på vissa avgörande punkter sprungit ifrån denna tio år gamla artikel. Elvander jämför Sverige med Norge och Danmark och hävdar att i Sverige har i över hundra år parternas frihet varit central för arbetsmarknadsordningen: starka centralorganisationer kan sköta lönepolitik och annat utan statlig inblandning. Elvander:

"The strength of the organizational system is the main reason why freedom on the labour market has been so consistently upheld (with the possible exception of the Stabilization Drive in 1990-93; see below), compared with the situation in the rest of the North. Thus, the idea of an official incomes policy is repugnant in Sweden but usually regarded as a normal and good thing in the neighbouring countries, though even in Sweden the practice of incomes policy was not in fact uncommon during the 1970s and 1980s. There is no government apparatus for incomes policy in the form of expertadvisory councils etc., whereas such bodies have existed in the other Nordic countries since the 1960s, usually with a tripartite composition. Only one case of state intervention in order to stop a labour market conflict has occurred (1971)." (s 121, jfr 127f) 

Idag, med Medlingsinstitutets instruktioner om att exportsektorn ska vara löneledande, gäller detta, som Sveriges ledande arbetsmarknadsforskare Elvander tog så självklart för tio år sedan, inte längre.

Elvander hävdar också att institutionen för medling mellan arbetsgivare och arbetstagare blev mycket svagare i Sverige än i Danmark och Norge, eftersom den allmänna rösträtten implementerades så sent i Sverige (1920, att jämföra med 1915 i Danmark och 1913 i Norge) vilket innebar att den liberala perioden mellan högerns styra i det auktoritära systemet och den socialdemokratiska dominansen som började på 1930-talet, blev så kort. Elvander ser liberalerna som en medlande faktor mellan arbete och kapital och att starkare liberala partier under perioden ledde till starkare medlingsinstitutioner. Medlingsinstituten i Norge och Danmark, säger Elvander, deltar mycket flitigare i avtalsrörelserna än vad deras motsvarighet i Sverige gör. De norska och danska MI har också tvångsmedling som verktyg (s 125).

Ursprunget till dagens svenska ordning med Medlingsinstitut och "Märket" -- pattern bargaining i internationell lingo -- såg dock Elvander också för tio år sedan. Efter 1980-talets kaos och höga inflation kom 1991-93 Rehnbergsgruppens "stabiliseringsrunda", och denna fortsatte att påverka också efter att den löpt ut:

"The so-called Stabilization Drive was in fact continued for the next two years with the help of the ordinary mediation in the bargaining round of 1993. This was done by two prominent members of the Negotiation Group who persuaded the parties in a context of pattern bargaining to accept declarations of principle concerning the Swedish economy and the need for further wage restraint. A lack of coordination in the bargaining round of 1995 impeded pattern bargaining and, consequently, the presentation and acceptance of similar economic declarations." (s 129)

Våren 1996 bad den socialdemokratiska regeringarna arbetsmarknadens parter att förhandla och bli eniga. Det viktigaste som ur dessa förhandlingar var Industriavtalet, som undertecknades i mars 1997.  Denna ordning, konstaterar Elvander, överskrider den gamla distinktionen mellan arbetare och tjänstemän, omfatttar hela den konkurrensutsatta sektorn och "presents an entirely new model for collective bargaining and conflict resolution." (s 130). Enligt Elvander gav Industriavtalet genast reallöneökningar för de berörda, för första gången sedan 1970-talet.

År 2000 skapades Medlingsinstitutet, som förstås innebär att Sverige har en statlig lönepolitik. Elvanders diskussion av detta då mycket nya fenomen är intressant i sin uppenbara ambivalens:

"What are the future prospects for incomes policy agreements in the Nordic countries? Even if there are tendencies at present in all three countries towards rank-and-file revolt in the unions against wage restraint, a continuation in various forms of the traditions of incomes policy in Finland and Denmark, and probably also in Norway, seems to be the most likely alternative. The main reason is that these countries are small open economies, heavily dependent on the fluctuations of the world market and therefore highly vulnerable, which creates a demand for coordination through tripartite consultation (Katzenstein 1985). But the same is true of Sweden! Why is incomes policy rejected here? In addition to the above- mentioned historical explanation, it should be pointed out that the Stabilization Drive and its continuation through the IA and the new mediation institute have created a Swedish type of substitute for a regular incomes policy: the government keeps its hands off, and the social partners take full responsibility for the bargaining outcomes. In fact, the mediation institute may, in the future, with the help of the parties, take on a role as an agent for incomes policy. The government has commissioned the institute `to promote a well-functioning wage formation'. This is a new and unusual function for a mediation institute -- it has no correspondence in the rest of the North, or in any other countries -- and it is supposed to be carried out through advisory economic councils that are appointed by the board of the institute among expert representatives of the central labour market organizations." (s 134)

Som vi ser så såg Elvander inte det som nödvändigt att MI skulle leda till en statlig lönepolitik -- SAF hade länge blockerat en sådan -- utan höll också dörren öppen för att Industriavtalet-ordningen skulle innebära att lönepolitiken skulle kunna hanteras och koordineras av sociala partners själva, även om det också var möjligt att Medlingsinstitutet skulle kunna bli en mer aktiv lönepolitisk institution.

Referens
Nils Elvander, "The Labour Market Regimes in the Nordic Countries: A Comparative Analysis", Scandinavian Political Studies 2002.

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Lönepolitik och politiska partier
"In all the Nordic countries, incomes policies have been intimately connected with Social Democratic governance. It is commonly held in IR literature that an effective incomes policy can be conducted only by a government that enjoys the confidence of the trade unions, i.e. in practice a government led by Social Democrats. However, the most important condition may be the government's ability to ful¢l its part of the agreement. In other words, it is the government's strength -- parliamentary, vis-a-vis
public opinion and in relation to the social partners -- which is essential, rather than its political party composition."

SAF:s offensiv i jämförande perspektiv
"SAF's withdrawal, which is unique to Sweden, can to a great extent be explained by a desire to reduce the central power of LO, which had been regarded as a dangerous threat to private enterprise ever since the 1970s. LO's power was part of the very strong position of the labour movement at large in Sweden, much stronger than in the rest of the North (where coalition governments have been the rule inDenmark and Finland and theNorwegian Labour Party has been less dominant than the Social Democratic Party in Sweden). Against this background it is understandable that SAF chose a much more ideologically radical strategy than its counterparts in the other Nordic countries. The IA of 1997 may, however, pave the way towards a situation of power balance, cooperation and pragmatism ^ more in line with the neighbouring countries, although without their forms of direct state intervention."(s 135f)