Bonderevolutionen till kommunism förutsatte enligt Moore, i John Stephens formulering,
“the existence of a weak bourgeoisie, a powerful agrarian elite, a highly centralized state, and high peasant revolutionary potential owing to increased traditional forms of exploitation in noncommercialized agriculture, the existence of solidaristic peasant communities, and weak ties to the (often absentee) landlords."Om ett land undgick kommunism blev det fascism eller demokrati. Stephens förklarar fem egenskaper som land ska ha om det ska bli fascistiskt. "The critical condition for the development of fascism is the development of a coalition of large landholders, the crown (the monarch, bureaucracy, and military-i.e., the state), and a politically dependent bourgeoisie of medium strength." Fem faktorer behövs för att en sådan antidemokratisk koalition ska formas och vinna. Ett, den jordägande överklassen måste vara den politiskt dominanta kraften i det sena 1800-talet. Två, "maintenance of peasant agriculture under landlords oriented to the market but employing political rather than market control of labor". Denna typ av jordbruk främjar en allians mellan den jordägande överklassen och staten, enligt Moore. Tre, tillräckligt mycket industrialisering för att ha en bourgeoisie, men inte så mycket att den blir den dominanta politiska kraften. Fyra, bourgeoisin kontrolleras och hålls politiskt beroende av en statsstyrd industrialisering, en "revolution ovanifrån". "Militarism and thus armaments production seal the bourgeoisie into the state-landlord dominated coalition and its reactionary and imperialistic politics." Fem, staten måste vara stark nog för att trycka ned uppror från arbetare och småbönder (s 1022f).
Den mest prominenta teoretiska alternativet till Moore som inte alls fokuserar på klasskrafter är Lipsets (1960) moderniseringsteori, som betonar att ökande välstånd i sig leder till mer demokrati. En annan teoretisering, som dock är lik Moore i den att den också betonar klasskrafter även om den mer vill betona vikten av arbetarklassen som demokratiserande faktor, är den marxistiska analysen hos t ex Therborn (1977)
Moores bok bestod av sex fallstudier: Storbritannien, Frankrike, USA, Kina, Japan och Indien. Stephens pekar på att alla dessa är stora länder, vilket kan förvrida jämförelsen eftersom, som Tilly (1975) visade, mer framgångsrika stater tenderade att bli stora och ha en stark armé/militarism (s 1028). Stephens utvidgar därför sin studie med ett antal små europeiska länder, inklusive de skandinaviska länderna som är vad jag ska fokusera på här.
Stephens hävdar att arbetarklassen var viktig för demokratiseringen i Skandinavien:
“In the case of Norway, the working class contributed to the final push for universal suffrage (embodied in various laws passed between 1898 and 1913), though earlier suffrage extensions were largely the work of the peasantry with the help of sections of the urban middle class (Rokkan 1966; Derry 1973). In Denmark, the working class/small and medium farmer/urban middle segments coalition as represented by the Social Democratic- Venstre coalition pressed through the 1901 introduction of parliamentary government. The driving force behind the 1915 introduction of universal suffrage was the Social Democrats and the Radikale Venstre, repre- senting the working class, small farmers, and segments of the middle class (Miller 1968; Dybahl 1969). It is important to note here that in Denmark and Norway (as well as Sweden), the medium farmers were ambivalent about the final suffrage extensions that resulted in the inclusion of large minorities of working-class voters not previously included, and it was among segments of the urban middle classes and the small farmers and tenants that labor found its ally. So, to argue that the effect of landholding patterns on political outcomes was caused simply by the authoritarian posture of large landlords and the democratic posture of smallholders is inaccurate. At the same time, it is important to note that the Scandinavian peasantry was divided, and even the medium and larger farmers, though not supportive of the final push for universal suffrage, generally contributed to the process of democratization by sup- porting earlier suffrage extensions.” (1029f)
Jag har tidigare diskuterat på bloggen (här, här) den turbulenta utvecklingen av klassrelationerna i Sverige under första världskriget. År 1917 var enligt tillgänglig statistik det år under 1900-talet som hade mest ojämlik inkomstfördelning, men ungefär 1917-1921 pågick en arbetarrörelsemobilisering och -radikalisering som resulterade bland annat i åtta timmars arbetsdag inom industrin och en kraftig ökning av reallönerna och löneandelen där. Också Stephens pekar på arbetarrörelseframsteg i Sverige och andra länder under den tiden:
Stephens sågar den analys av Storbritanniens demokratisering som betonar intern partikonkurrens inom överklassen som demokratiseringens utlösande faktor (1032). Stephens betonar istället extern press -- från arbetarklassen [2]. Contra Lipset hävdar han att det inte alls var den utbildade medelklassen som orsakade demokratisering. Stephens håller inte heller med Moore, som betonade bourgeioisins progressiva roll. Stephens:”The war and its outcome changed the balance of power in society, strengthening the working class and weakening the upper classes. The ruling class was discredited, particularly in the de- feated countries. Labor support was necessary-at home for the pro- duction effort and on the front for the first mass-mobilization, mass- conscription war of this scale and duration. And, finally, the war economy and mass conscription strengthened the hand of labor in the economy, enabling it to extract concessions for the coming period of peace.8 One indicator of the change in class power was the swell in labor organization from an average prewar level of 9% of the labor force to a postwar peak of 30% among the antagonists, which experienced the tran- sition to democracy in this period (1918 or 1919). Organization more than doubled in the two nonparticipants (Sweden and the Netherlands), which experienced the same transition at this time (Stephens 1979, p. 115). In all these countries, the working class played a key, if not the key, role in the transition to democracy. But, as Therborn (1977) notes, the working class was not strong enough alone. It needed allies or unusual conjunctures of events to effect the introduction of democracy. As an indicator of this, it could be pointed out that in no case did the working-class parties receive electoral majorities even after the introduction of universal suffrage.In England, Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, it can be argued that the war only accelerated the introduction of democracy. In each country, the prodemocratic coalition-the parties and the underlying alignment of social forces-had formed or was in the process of forma-tion. In most cases, the coalition had been responsible for previous suffrage extension, such as the 1907 reform in Sweden or the 1893 reform in Belgium. In Sweden, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the agrarian elites were too weak to be a significant political force. In Sweden, as in Norway and Denmark, the peasantry was split on the question of universal suffrage. It was the Liberals (who were based in the urban middle classes, in the dissenting religions, and in the small farmers in the North and West) who joined the Social Democrats in the push for suffrage extension. The war stimulated the Conservative capitulation in Sweden, and an interparty compromise, implemented in 1917, followed several decades of political pressure (through strikes, demonstrations, and parliamentary obstruction) by the Social Democrats and the trade unions in cooperation with segments of the middle class.” (1030) [1]Fn 8 “The effect of this change in power relations already made itself felt on the material welfare of the mass of noncombatant working people in Britain. Winter (1986) shows conclusively that life expectancy rose and infant mortality declined dramatically dur- ing the war and that that was a result, primarily, of the improved material situation of the working class in the war economy and, secondarily, of health and welfare policy innovations.”
“The bourgeoisie, whose role in the introduction of democracy has been emphasized in so many accounts, from Marxist to liberal, played a positive role in only two cases, Britain and France. Moreover, in these two countries, it was only segments of the class that cooperated in the push for democracy and then only after earlier histories of popular agitation for democracy and bourgeois resistance to it. In all the others, the bourgeoisie was one of the centers of resis- tance to working-class political incorporation.” (1035)
Stephens kombinerar hegemoni (Gramsci) med politisk mobilisering (Lipset och Rokkan) för att analysera småbrukares politik i olika nationella situationer.
”Lipset and Rokkan (1967, esp. pp. 44-46) point out that, in Protestant smallholding countries (or regions of countries, e.g., Swiss cantons), the peasants themselves were the agents of their own mobilization, and the political form was agrarian parties. In Protestant largeholding countries, the mobilizing agents were the landed upper classes; thus the political weight of the peasants strengthened that political bloc. In Catholic countries (or areas of countries, e.g., southern Germany), the mobilizing agents were Catholic parties.” (1039)Stephens slutsats efter en genomgång av olika cases -- Italien, Tyskland m fl -- blir att Therborn, inte Lipset, hade rätt, även om han överbetonade arbetarklassens roll:
“The overview of the transition to democracy confirmed Therborn's (1977) contention that the working class, represented by socialist parties and trade unions, was the single most important force in the majority of countries in the final push for universal male suffrage and responsible government, though in several of the smallholding countries the small peasants or the urban middle class played the major role. This contradicts the modernization view, as advanced by Lipset (1960), which argues that economic development and democracy are connected primarily through the expansion of education, the growth of the middle class, and so on. Rather, it was the growth of the working class and its capacity for self- organization that were most critical for the final breakthrough of democ- racy. The rapid industrialization experienced by Western Europe in the five decades before World War I increased the size and, with varying time lags, the degree of organization of the working class and thus changed the balance of class power in civil society to the advantage of democratic forces.But, by focusing only on the final step of the process, Therborn rather exaggerates the role of the politically organized working class.” (1064f)
Fotnot
[1] Stephens pekar i en fotnot på att Moore tidigare har applicerats på det svenska fallet: “On Sweden, see Rustow (1955), Verney (1957), Hadenius et al. (1970), Castles (1973), and Tilton (1974). Tilton and Castles both explicitly apply the Moore thesis to the Swedish case. Both point to the weakness of the landed aristocracy and the strength and independence of the peasantry in accounting for the democratic outcome in Sweden. Tumin (1978) makes a similar point in his application of the Moore thesis to the Dutch case.” (1031n)
[2] Stephens är, eller var åtminstone, maktresursteoretiker i Walter Korpis anda. Så här förklarar han 1989 sin analys av staten: ”In the view of the state in advanced capitalist democracies that I have
advanced elsewhere (Stephens 1979; see also Korpi 1982), the state is seen as
reflecting the balance of class power in civil society. 15 Crudely put, the
capitalist class derives its power from property and the working class from
organization.” (1037f)
Fn till ovanstående à “The passage in the text is the brutal summary of my
view of the state in advanced capitalist societies. See Stephens (1979, pp.
47-48, 77-81) for an elaboration. Not only would this theoretical view have to
be altered to fit the conditions of the authoritarian capitalist regimes of
pre-World War II Europe, since it is quite clear that the extension of suffrage
increases the influence of the working class, but subsequent work (e.g., Evans
et al. 1985; Orloff and Skocpol 1984) also convinces me that the state has to
be given a stronger role than I attributed to it in that work. See
Evans and Stephens (1988) for an updated viewpoint.” (1038n)
Referenser
Castles, Francis G. 1973. "Barrington Moore's Thesis and Swedish Political Development." Government and Opposition 8 (3): 313-31.
John Stephens, “Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western Europe, 1870-1939: A Test of the Moore Thesis”, American Journal of Sociology mars 1989.
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